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EDITOR’S NOTE

ur gasoline has been unleaded for years, but for many
of us, our drinking water has not. The recent disclosure
of widespread lead contamination in Washington D.C.'s
drinking water unveiled a massive breakdown in environmental
compliance and enforcement. Area residents have been
unknowingly contaminating themselves with potentially dangerous concentrations of lead for years, despite awareness of the
problem by local health officials.
The story broke in late January
2004 and was immediately met with
outrage, confusion, and fear.
According to the WASHINGTON POST,
the D.C. Water and Sewer Authority
("WASA") and the D.C. Health
Department knew about the problem
for at least fifteen months before the
public was informed. Amazingly, it
took the D.C. Health Department nearly a month from the time the problem
was first reported to issue a health
advisory. Responding to increasing
public concern, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
recently stepped up the pressure on those responsible, charging
WASA with violating six requirements of the Federal Lead and
Copper Rule for failing to properly notify city residents of the
problem and, more generally, for failing to adequately protect
public health.
Ironically, as EPA begins cracking down on the Washington
D.C. government to ensure compliance and enforcement of
drinking water laws in the nation's capital, the Agency continues
to reduce environmental enforcement across the country. Since
coming into office in 2001, the Bush administration has significantly decreased enforcement of federal environmental laws.
For example, a recent review of fifteen years of enforcement
records by the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER showed that the monthly
average of violation notices has dropped 58 percent since the
Bush administration took office compared to the monthly average under President Clinton. In comparison to the Clinton and
Bush I administrations, which issued an average of 183 and 195
citations per month, respectively, the current administration has
issued a much lower average of just 77 citations per month.
The precipitous decline in environmental enforcement under
President Bush is often justified by the administration as a necessary component of economic growth. However, this strategy of
trading off environmental protection for economic gain has been
debunked repeatedly, including in a recent report by the White
House's Office of Management and Budget, as reported in this
issue of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY.

Whether the result of industry influence (as in the Bush
administration's lax environmental policy) or bureaucratic
malaise (like we have seen in the D.C. lead case) diminished
compliance and enforcement will inevitably result in widespread
environmental degradation and continuing public health crises.
Fortunately, the administration's policy of reduced enforcement is not the entire story. Indeed, there are many hard-working government officials who tirelessly work to ensure environmental compliance despite the clear change in
policy at the top of the administration.
The article by Jim Rubin, the head of
the international environmental
enforcement division at the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), discussing the DOJ's efforts to combat
transnational environmental crime,
exemplifies an area where significant
progress continues to be made.
However, as Marsha Mulkey's
terrific feature article discusses,
achieving high rates of compliance depends as much on clear
legislative drafting and consistent judicial interpretation, than on
diligent enforcement. Transparency, public disclosure of accurate
environmental indicators, and informed public participation are
all essential components to effective environmental governance.
Even the most far-reaching laws and policies will fail absent vigorous and consistent compliance and enforcement.

“Our gasoline has
been unleaded for
years, but for many
of us, our drinking
water has not.”
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Dave Newman
Editor-in-Chief
Special Acknowledgement: The staff and advisors to
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY greatly appreciate
the significant support provided for this issue by Washington
College of Law alumnus Ken Markowitz (1989). Ken is founder
and president of Earthpace LLC, a company dedicated to
advancing the principles of sustainable development through the
effective communication and integration of the best available
scientific, legal, and economic information. For more information: http://www.earthpace.com.
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JUDGES AND OTHER LAWMAKERS: CRITICAL

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

M

by Marcia E. Mulkey*
INTRODUCTION

ost of the dialog about environmental law enforcement starts with the assumption that the law is established and concentrates on those who are actively
engaged in assuring compliance with the laws. As a result, much
of the focus on building of enforcement capacity emphasizes the
identification, investigation and prosecutorial response to law
violations (or, as a supplemental or alternative approach, the
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education, encouragement, and inducement of law compliance).
This paper addresses the less frequently discussed but vitally
important role of law-makers in the success of enforcement and
compliance programs. Broadly defined, law-making involves
the activities of legislators and law drafters, regulators and regulation-drafters, permit writers, license preparers, and all others
who codify the applicable requirements as well as the activities
of judges and other adjudicators who apply the law to the facts
of particular cases in ways that define the scope and nature of
the law. Judges, of course, do more than "make law". They are
critical arbiters of the fairness of the system, help assure reasonable consistency among similarly situated cases, and provide
the mechanism through which intransigent law violators can be
compelled to comply.
This paper addresses the important ways in which law-making can and should enhance and support enforcement of environmental laws, whether at the sub-national, national or international levels. It also discusses the special role of judges (and
similar adjudicative decision-makers) in the environmental
enforcement process and draws conclusions about opportunities
to improve the effectiveness of law-making and judging in the
environmental law context. Because judicial law-making and
other critical judicial contributions to environmental law
enforcement occur only after and based in part upon law made
by legislators, regulators and permit preparers, law drafters and
judges are covered in "Enhancing Environmental Enforcement
in the Law-Drafting Process" and "The Special Role of the
Judiciary," and "Conclusions and Suggestions for Improving the
Effectiveness of Judges and Other Law-Makers" is devoted to
conclusions and suggestions applicable to either or both.

ENHANCING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN
THE LAW-DRAFTING PROCESS

ASSUMING THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS

While many considerations influence the drafting of instruments imposing environmental requirements, none can be fully
effectuated without clarity in conveying the choices involved
*Marcia E. Mulkey is Visiting Professor of Law at Temple University's James
E. Beasley School of Law. She is serving on an Intergovernmental Personnel
Assignment from the United States Environmental Protection Agency, where
she is a member of the Senior Executive Service. The ideas expressed here are
her own and not necessarily those of the USEPA. The author thanks Joseph
Anclien of Temple's Law School and Melanie Nakagawa and Kristen
McGeeney of American University's Washington College of Law for their work
to help assure that this article is fully supported and documented. Portions of
this article appear in a somewhat different form in a document prepared by this
author for use by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization preliminarily titled Guidelines on Compliance and Enforcement of Pesticide
Regulatory Programme.
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and mechanisms to determine whether those choices are successfully implemented. Whether based on technology availability or desired levels of protection, on absolute values or costbenefit considerations, with detailed specificity or with performance expectations and flexibility of acceptable approaches1
the chosen requirements are, in the end, designed to be followed. Put simply, without compliance with the environmental
protection choices reflected in environmental law requirements,
such requirements are empty gestures at best and misleading
shams at worst. This section discusses a range of considerations
that go into assuring that environmental law drafting (whether
legislative, regulatory, or permitting) succeeds in creating
instruments that assure that compliance is achievable and that
non-compliance can be identified and addressed.

Technical and Economic Realism

As a threshold matter, requirements must be possible to
achieve and be practicable in the circumstances in which they

“Law-drafters at all levels
can be critical players in
assuring that helpful,
relevant, timely and
accurate information is
disseminated.”
are applied. While it is certainly appropriate to establish requirements that are not easy to achieve and that require costs and
effort (even considerable costs and effort), there is no way to
comply with-or to enforce successfully-requirements that are
plainly impractical. If requirements are too stringent, depend on
technology that does not exist and cannot be developed, are
effective so quickly that the regulated community cannot take
the necessary steps to comply or involve costs well beyond the
capacity of the regulated community to bear, the result can be a
lack of respect for compliance with law and a lack of willingness on the part of government to enforce.2
Legislative designers may feel that it is preferable to establish a very high standard in order to express the most desired
outcome or to accommodate public desires for the highest levels of protection. However, if the intent is ever to achieve such
outcomes and desires, it is generally advisable to describe such
high standards as goals, to establish them with a longer-term
effective date, or to limit their initial application only to larger
commercial entities or to situations where additional resources
can be made available to assure achievability. If there is not
some way to bridge the gap between the possible and the leg3

islatively required, the requirements are doomed to failure.3

Ease of Understanding; Accessibility

In the environmental field, where both the environmental
conditions of concern and the mechanisms to achieve environmental protection involve complex science and sophisticated
technology, it is often difficult to describe requirements with
clarity and simplicity. When one adds to the scientific complexity the additional challenges associated with policy considerations that encourage flexibility, avoidance of unnecessary burdens, and harnessing of market forces and other incentives, the
law-drafter is presented with many competing pressures.
Notwithstanding this difficult juggling act, the law-drafter cannot escape the plain truth that only those requirements that are
understood can be obeyed. The goal, for this purpose, is clarity,
understandability, and the avoidance of ambiguity. Achieving
that goal is no small task. Law drafters must clarify who has the
obligation.4 Definitions of key concepts are often critical, especially for distinguishing such things as product from waste.5 The
requirement should be clear about the time period covered,6
about the spatial reach, and about whether and when any exemptions or exceptions apply. 7
One effective technique for law drafters to assure that
requirements are achieving the intended message is to think
through how they themselves could go about avoiding having to
comply with the intent of the requirements by exploiting loopholes or taking advantage of unclear provisions.8 Similarly, the
requirements could be shared with persons expert in the regulated activity in a way that evaluates whether there is full and
accurate understanding.9 Persons with enforcement experience,
especially those experienced in field investigations and in development of legal actions in response to violations, can help identify potential problems with clarity. Based on this kind of feedback, the requirements can then be written to minimize the
opportunities for misunderstanding and evasion.
Of equal importance to understandability is accessibility of
information about applicable requirements. No matter how
clearly set forth, requirements that are not known to the regulated community will not be followed. On the other hand, complex
and highly technical requirements that are accompanied by adequate information and assistance delivered in a manner that is
workable and effective for regulated entities can often be fully
and effectively implemented. It is for these reasons that compliance assistance efforts by government, industry groups, private
consultants, attorneys, and others can play such a crucial role in
the implementation of environmental compliance programs.10
Law-drafters at all levels can be critical players in assuring that
helpful, relevant, timely and accurate information is disseminated through these various methods. Careful and understandable
documentation of legislative and regulatory history, accompanying compliance manuals, and other contemporaneous materials designed to both explain the requirements and to target relevant audiences with affirmative outreach efforts can all be part
of the law-drafters' role.11
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Clear and Defined Duties; Mandatory Language

No matter how carefully crafted or technically clear, legal
provisions can only give rise to a genuine duty if they are worded so that they specifically impose a duty. For example, a statement that a person (owner, operator, user) should act in a certain
way will generally be seen only as advice or encouragement.
The failure to do so would not clearly violate any enforceable
duty.12 While there could be a number of sound reasons to
include certain advisory or hortatory provisions in environmental regulatory instruments, such provisions should not be regarded as effective if the intention is to obtain full and meaningful
compliance. Words like must, is required to, mandatory, shall,
has the duty to all help to ensure that obligations bear the force
of law.13 The problem with choice of language that is not sufficiently mandatory tends to occur more frequently in the permit
or license drafting context, where there are fewer persons
involved in the drafting and the law-drafters may be less experienced or trained in choice of language considerations.
While clearly stating specific duties in the substantive provisions of environmental laws, regulations and permits may be
sufficient to assure enforceability, many law drafters also
address enforceability through enforcement provisions, which
not only establish such things as the forums for adjudication of
violations or the nature of available sanctions,14 but also specify what constitutes a violation or an unlawful act under the
law.15 While these "enforcement" provisions are most common
in statutes, they can also be included in regulations (so long as
they are consistent with the statute under which the regulations
are promulgated) and in permits or licenses (again, consistent
with the governing authority under which they are issued).
These kinds of provisions can have the effect of clarifying and
emphasizing the mandatory nature of the duties set forth elsewhere in the statute (or regulation or permit) and of assuring that
the regulated entity has full and fair notice of what actions or
omissions constitute enforceable violations. If this approach is
used, however, it is important to be sure that all the duties
described elsewhere in the law are brought into these provisions,
unless there is a specific intent to omit them and exempt them
from the duty to comply or to render that duty unenforceable
through sanctions or mandatory legal action.

Measurability; Ease of Detection

It is, of course, critical for both the regulated entity and for
the government to be able to detect, determine, and measure
whether there is compliance with a requirement. In the absence
of this fundamental capacity, neither can know whether compliance is achieved, and the government cannot carry any burden
of proving or demonstrating violations.16 Whether or not compliance measurement17 is made a part of the duties imposed, the
availability of reasonable, practicable approaches to measurement is critical to the effectiveness of any requirement. While
the technical complexity of particular requirements or policy
considerations relating to regulatory burdens or regulatory flexibility may lead to situations where simple, instantaneous, and
SPRING 2004

inexpensive compliance measures are not available, no requirement should be embraced until the law drafters can identify
some workable means for both the regulated entity and the
enforcing government to evaluate compliance. As noted here,
the law-drafters may provide for the enforcing governments to
rely on compliance demonstration requirements imposed on the
regulated, but in those situations, effective governmental
enforcement would depend on clarity about when and how such
demonstrations are or can be required.18

ASSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE LEGAL TOOLS

While the emphasis of the previous section is upon the
characteristics of law drafting at the stage of designing and
imposing specific environmental protection requirements, this
section addresses the provisions of law which provide the
authorities and tools necessary to conduct effective enforcement
activities and create a climate of credible governmental capaci-

“At the heart of every
compliance approach is
the interaction between
the regulated community
and the enforcing
authority.”
ty to oversee, motivate, and mandate compliance. In many legal
regimes, provisions of law outside the four corners of specific
environmental statutes will have significant impact on both the
availability of particular enforcement instruments and options
and on the constraints and limits on their use.19 Notwithstanding
these more broadly applicable authorizations and limitations,
law drafters can and should consider whether and to what extent
environmental statutes and implementing regulations and
licenses might include provisions designed to assure the availability and responsible use of mechanisms to provide for comprehensive, efficient, effective, and fair enforcement.

Compliance Monitoring

At the heart of every compliance approach is the interaction
between the regulated community and the enforcing authority.20
Regardless of the enforcement "philosophy" adopted by government, which might range from a primarily incentive or
reward based approach through a mixed multiple-tool approach
to a purely deterrence/punitive approach,21 government will
need to be able to evaluate the extent, nature, and state of compliance. In order for government to motivate compliance by any
means or combination of means, it must have some capacity to
4

understand the extent of compliance and non-compliance with
enough particularity to identify the significance for success or
failure of the desired environmental protection. In order to plan
enforcement priorities and target limited resources, government
must have some understanding of what levels of compliance are
occurring for the various requirements and regulated sectors. In
order to become involved in motivating individual regulated
entities, government must have the capacity to investigate and
evaluate compliance at the entity or facility level.
Monitoring of compliance can be based on record-keeping
and self-reporting by regulated entities, inspections or other
investigations, and measurements of prevailing environmental
conditions. Each of these approaches can be enhanced by specific and thoughtful law drafting.

Self-Monitoring, Self-Record Keeping
and Self-Reporting

Law drafters may encourage or require self-monitoring,
self-record keeping, and self-reporting by regulated entities,
either as a broadly applicable part of general environmental law
requirements or with particularity for certain facilities, sizes of
operations, or periods of time. Such provisions shift much of the
burden for documenting compliance from government to the
regulated community. They sacrifice some of the independence
and credibility of government for the increased expertise, effi-

Inspections and Investigations

Even with strong and comprehensive self-monitoring and
reporting, governmental capacity for independent evaluation of
compliance activities will depend in part on the legal framework
provided for inspections and investigations. Effective inspections and investigations, for example, require adequate authority
for physical access to facilities, for opportunities to interview
knowledgeable persons, for review of books and records, for
obtaining physical samples, for use of measuring and analytical
equipment, or for taking photographs or other reproducing
images. All of these opportunities carry the potential for abuse or
overreaching, and law drafters must balance the need for effectiveness and efficiency against considerations of fairness and
burden.28 Because effective inspection authorities must be both
broad and relatively intrusive, measures to insure governmental
integrity acquire great importance. One way to build confidence
in the exercise of these authorities is to limit their use to persons
who have government-issued inspector credentials.29
Well-designed inspection regimes will account for circumstances in which entry is denied and assure that legal mechanisms are available for inspectors to obtain the aid of the courts,
the police, or some other appropriate authority that can both
assure necessary access and allow owners or operators to challenge whether the access is lawful. Where practicable, environmental investigative authorities should be consistent with comparable authorities under
other laws, such as health or occupational
safety provisions, that are likely to apply to the
same facilities. This helps promote cross-training of inspectors, sharing of expertise and
techniques, and effective information sharing
about facilities.

“The way in which judges
understand and apply existing law
serves as a powerful feedback loop
to the drafters of statutes,
regulations, and permits.”
ciency, and cost allocation associated with the regulated community. The required information can relate directly to compliance status22 or it can relate more broadly to environmental or
ambient conditions.23
These tools can make a big contribution to the enforcement
process by supplementing scarce government resources, and it is
almost always sensible for legislators to authorize governments
to require self-monitoring, record keeping, and reporting in
appropriate circumstances. The decision whether to actively
require such activities in implementing regulations and permits
should consider several factors: 1) practicality, costs, and burdens to the regulated community; 2) usefulness and intended purpose of the information;24 3) reliability and credibility;25 and 4)
ability of government to oversee and manage the information,26
including whether to make the information publicly available.27
5

Other Monitoring and Evaluative Tools

Law drafters may also consider providing
legal mechanisms to support government or private environmental monitoring, hot lines and
other citizen-based reporting, and cross-program information sharing.30 In addition to
authorizing these various options, legislators can provide for
funding to support them. Regulatory and permit drafters can
develop provisions that facilitate the use of these kinds of tools.31

Orders and Injunctive Authorities

Compliance Orders

Although the statutory and regulatory provisions may clearly impose duties, the government's detection of a violation is not
always sufficient to motivate the violator to comply. Legislative
drafters can provide government with the tools to require compliance. Even where the violator is willing to comply, it may not
always be possible to do so quickly, and good enforcement practice may warrant orderly oversight of a schedule and intermediate steps to compliance. Compliance orders can specify the steps
necessary to achieve compliance, establish reasonable but firm
deadlines, and create the potential for escalating consequences
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

for those who do not obey the requirements. Compliance orders
can also provide for the shutdown of operations, suspension of
permits or other measures where they are necessary to prevent
and address violations.
Compliance orders may be either administrative or judicial
(civil).32 They may be issued with the consent of the violator,
where the terms are negotiated and agreed to by both the enforcement agency and the violator (and in the case of the courts,
approved by the court.) Negotiated orders are usually termed
"consent orders" (or "consent court decrees") and may include
provisions for resolving disputes that arise under the order or an
agreed-upon penalty for violation of terms of the orders. Most
law drafters simply provide authority for the issuance of administrative or judicial orders and the authority for consent orders is
inferred from such authority.33 So long as general order authority is provided, compliance orders that cannot or should not be
obtained through negotiation and consent can nevertheless be
issued. If law drafters want to be sure that there is complete clarity about the availability of both consent orders and unilateral
orders, it could be useful to explicitly provide for both.34
Law drafters may explicitly provide that enforcement agencies can seek from the courts both preliminary compliance orders
(i.e. prior to resolution of the merits of the claims about the violations) and final orders (following resolution of the substantive
claims). Where fully matured legal systems provide for both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for all types of proceedings,35 it may not be necessary to make any such explicit
provisions in specific environmental laws. In the absence of such
a system, law drafters may wish to explicitly authorize this kind
of flexibility, in light of the significant human health and environmental issues that can be present in some environmental
enforcement cases.
While court-issued orders will, by definition, require that
enforcing agencies bring the matter to the court, there can also be
situations where administratively issued orders will also come
before courts. If alleged violators choose to refuse to comply
with administrative compliance orders or to challenge such
orders,36 the matter could come to the court either through a
mechanism by which the alleged violator may appeal the order
to the court37 or through an approach by which the enforcing
authority may take the matter to the courts to seek judicial
enforcement of the order. It is useful for law-drafters to clarify
which of these routes is intended.38
It bears mention that compliance requirements can be
imposed in connection with criminal proceedings. At the point of
criminal proceedings where guilt has been established, the question of an appropriate sentence will arise. Specific criminal sanction authorities are discussed in section "Criminal Sanctions"
infra. In addition to sanctions, judges can impose conditions on
the criminal sentence which could include compliance requirements.39 While the authority to impose such conditions on sentences may generally be inferred from sentencing authority, any
uncertainty about that option could be addressed at the law
drafting stage.
SPRING 2004

Emergency Authorities

In certain, usually rare situations, government may need an
immediate and strong mechanism to ameliorate an imminent
hazard or to stabilize and address the adverse impacts associated with an emergency situation. Such situations involve harm
that is already occurring or appears imminent and may result
from accident or deliberate acts. Due to their emergency nature,
these situations may warrant action before an adequate investigation into causation or fault or they may warrant action independent of the issue of whether there has been a violation of law.
In these circumstances, emergency authorities can provide an
orderly, effective, and reasonably circumscribed governmental
response. Legislative provisions for emergency authorities can
take the form of administrative or judicial orders issued to own-

“... strong and swift
judicial action may be
essential to the integrity of
both the particular
enforcement situation and
the overall program for
compliance with
environmental law.”
ers, operators, or other responsible persons to stabilize the situation, contain or rectify the immediately hazardous conditions,
or provide necessary protections for affected persons.40
Whether the order authority is designed to be administratively
issued in the first instance with recourse to the courts to obtain
compliance with such orders or to be sought directly from a
court from the outset, either the overall judicial system or the
specific enabling legislation will need a mechanism for expedited proceedings and rapid action by the courts.

Sanction Authorities

Sanctions are the various forms of adverse consequences
that can be imposed upon violators as a tool either to motivate
the specific violators, usually called specific deterrence, or to
motivate other potential violators, usually called general deterrence.41 Sanctions can also be used to promote economic fairness by removing or reducing the competitive advantage that
may be gained by those who violate rather than bear the cost of
compliance.42 Generally, such adverse consequence may be
either civil (or administrative) monetary penalties or various
criminal sanctions.
6

Civil Monetary Penalties: Administrative and Judicial

As part of designing the authority to issue monetary penalties, choices must be made about where the authority is established (administrative, judicial, or both), the amounts and types
of such penalties, how they relate to multiple violations at the
same time and violations over time, and the procedures for
imposition, challenges, and appeals.
The threshold question of whether to provide for penalties
that may be imposed directly by administrative authorities or to
require that enforcement agencies seek penalties only through
the court system is closely related to a host of other considerations regarding administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms.43 In broad terms, administrative authorities may be more
efficient, faster, and lower profile.
The counterpart effect of those
characteristics could mean that
administrative mechanisms involve
fewer safeguards and carry less
impact and clout. Administrative
penalty systems may be best
designed and used where relatively
modest penalties are appropriate or
where rapid and efficient responses
are particularly valued.
It is possible and may be
desirable, to provide for both
administratively and judicially imposed civil penalties. This
approach allows the enforcement agency to tailor the penalty
response to the facts and circumstances of each situation.
Where the amount of potential penalty is set lower for administrative than for judicial actions, lawmakers should set the
administrative limit high enough to provide for meaningful
use of the administrative tool.44
The legislative amount authorized for penalties involves a
number of complicated questions. It is extremely difficult if not
impossible to establish in legislation a precise penalty amount
that is appropriate across the full range of violations and violators. This problem can be addressed by establishing a set maximum penalty amount for each violation or for each day of violation. Under this approach, the implication is that the maximum penalty is designed for the most extreme, severe, and
compelling circumstances. In order for this assumption to
prove workable, it becomes important both to set the maximum
at a significantly higher level than would be appropriate for
many or most "normal" situations and for all concerned to
understand that this is the case. One way that statutes can
attempt to address the necessarily wide discretion that this
leaves to enforcement agencies and courts is to enumerate criteria that should be considered in setting penalties, ranging
from factors like seriousness and duration of violations to size
and compliance history of violators.45 In general, the maximum
penalty should be sufficient to recapture the economic advantages from non-compliance where appropriate.46 Setting a specific currency value for penalties can be complicated where

currencies are unstable and inflation is rapid or highly unpredictable. One answer can be a process for the fixed amount to
be automatically or easily adjusted.47

Criminal Sanctions

Wherever violations of environmental laws can be categorized as crimes, there will be some kind of provision for criminal
sanctions. In some systems, the criminal law contains all of the
various elements applicable to environmental crimes, and no
additional separate law-making is left to the drafters of the environmental statutes. For this approach, it may only be necessary
to define violations of the various environmental statutes as
crimes.48 Usually, though, either the environmental laws or the
general criminal laws or both will benefit from greater particularity and specificity regarding
both criminalization of environmental violations and the scope
and nature of criminal sanctions.
The nature, use, and significance of criminal sanctions for
environmental violations can vary
considerably across national legal
systems. If the environmental
protection approach includes
extensive and workable civil (perhaps including administrative)
penalty authority, criminal sanctions will likely be reserved for the more severe and egregious
cases and will be available only after the government has met a
high standard of proof.49 In systems with limited or no civil,
judicial, or administrative penalty authority, the criminal law
system may be used for much less serious violations across a
large segment of regulated behaviors.50 In this latter context,
both the degree of social stigma and the severity of criminal
sanctions is likely to cover a broader range to reflect the varying
degrees of importance attached to such violations.
Despite these widely variant approaches to the role of criminal enforcement in the environmental context, the basic types of
potential criminal sanctions are monetary (e. g. fines or forfeiture)
and various forms of loss of liberty (up to and including imprisonment).51 Lesser forms of restraints on liberty might include
mandatory public service, "house arrest," or constraints on travel
or movement. Since corporations usually cannot perform these
liberty related sanctions, criminal penalties on corporations or
other entities usually involve fines, although individual corporate
officers can be held liable in appropriate situations.52
In setting the statutory levels of applicable criminal sanctions, whether monetary amounts or duration of imprisonment
or other confinement, lawmakers face the same basic considerations as discussed regarding civil penalties, supra at "Civil
Monetary Penalties: Administrative and Judicial." And, as in
that context, where the issue is resolved through setting a maximum level for given violations or violation days, thought
should be given to providing guidance about the exercise of discretion in imposition of particular sanctions for specific cases.

“Environmental law is
emerging as a leading
area for international
judicial networking.”
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Such guidance might take the form of statutory criteria or
administratively issued detailed provisions.53

Citizen Suits and Other Enforcement Approaches

So far, this section has identified and discussed a range of
authorities and legal provisions that allow, support, or enhance
governmental exercise of the enforcement function. Certain
other governmental actions can have the effect of achieving
compliance or punishing or deterring violators. These include
barring violators from participating in government programs or
contracts,54 the termination or suspension of licenses or permits,55 or the shutting down of facilities or the seizure or stoppage of sales of goods.56 These kind of authorities can be established for administrative or judicial implementation and will
need mechanisms for challenges and appeals as ultimate
recourse to the courts to assure their effectiveness.
Although governmental entities are almost always likely to
be the prime enforcement operators under any legal system,
there may be significant impacts on environmental law compliance as the result of other actors and entities. Banks and other
lenders may condition funds availability on environmental compliance. Insurers may require compliance as a condition of
obtaining insurance or of recovery of claims. Institutional or
general public consumers of goods may condition purchases on
environmental law compliance. Private business associations
may establish formal or informal mechanisms to enhance member compliance. Environmental and other law drafters may wish
to encourage, facilitate, or even mandate certain of these private
mechanisms to support environmental law compliance. For
example, legal mechanisms for greater public access to information can facilitate all of these approaches.57
Private lawsuits represent another avenue for direct or de
facto enforcement of environmental laws. Some may be grounded in various common law principles, especially torts,58 but others may be based on express statutory provisions for citizen
enforcement of environmental requirements. These mechanisms
by which citizens effectively serve as private attorney generals
are generally called citizen suit provisions in U. S. federal environmental law.59 Law-makers may choose to make explicit provision for such causes of action and may provide implementing
details regarding who may bring such actions,60 where they may
be brought, what remedies may be sought,61 and against
whom.62 Either the environmental statute or more general legal
provisions may allow for the payment of attorneys fees to successful citizen plaintiffs.63

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

THE JUDICIARY AS LAW-MAKER

Without opening the debate of whether judges should be
activist and expansive in the development of law or confined
and constrained by narrow construction of applicable law,64 it is
safe to conclude that judges serve as law-makers in a number of
important ways. In each instance of the application of law to the
facts of a case, the judge will necessarily clarify and interpret
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the law for that case.65 Whether in common law legal systems
driven by res judicata66 and stare decisis67 or in code-based systems where judicial opinion may only have persuasive effect in
later decisions, judicial decisions have a significant impact upon
subsequent cases with similar law or facts.68 The way in which
judges understand and apply existing law serves as a powerful
feedback loop to the drafters of statutes, regulations, and permits. In the particularization of injunctive relief, judges may
describe specific steps and elements of law compliance.
Through all of these routes, judges are either making law or
influencing the making of law.69
In its most fundamental sense, judicial interpretation and
implementation of legislation, regulations, licenses, or permits may come in the context of legal challenges to such provisions. Legislation may be challenged as unconstitutional or
ultra vires in some way.70 Regulations are frequently reviewable by courts.71 Permits, licenses, and administrative orders
may be appealable to the courts, before or after an administrative appellate process.72 Beyond direct legal challenges, all
forms of environmental legal requirements may be subject to
judicial interpretation, clarification,73 and application in the
context of enforcement cases, whether civil or criminal, or
whether initiated by government or by citizens. In all of these
types of judicial involvement, the opportunity is available for
judges to contribute materially to the clarity and enforceability of such provisions. In some situations, judicial interpretation may enhance the understandability and enforceability of
the requirements. In others, judicial review may identify
shortcomings in existing legislation that impede or prevent
effective enforcement.74

THE IMPACT OF THE JUDICIARY ON THE CLIMATE OF
COMPLIANCE, RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW,
SOCIETAL NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS

A fundamental and central tenet of successful environmental protection compliance and enforcement programs is
the credibility and integrity of the government.75 If government is or is perceived to be corrupt or even merely capricious
and unfair, it is unlikely that the regulated community or the
society at large will support environmental compliance
goals.76 An independent, professional, and credible judiciary
is a key component of the rule of law, respect for law, and
belief in governmental integrity.77 Because of its role as an
arbiter of competing interests and its neutrality in any specific
dispute, the judiciary's upholding of appropriate and wellgrounded environmental protection laws and actions to implement them adds materially to their acceptance by society at
large. By the same token, the judiciary's rejection of inappropriate application of such laws increases the trust of all in the
system and reinforces the expectation that such laws can and
will be soundly applied.78
By contrast, if the judiciary exhibits ineptitude, corruption,
bias, or hostility to legitimate legislative and executive action,
the balance necessary for acceptance of the entire governmental
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structure is undermined and environmental law compliance (and
other types of law compliance) will suffer or completely collapse. It is, therefore, not exaggeration to say that as the judiciary goes, so goes environmental law compliance.

THE BALANCING ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY TO
MODERATE PROSECUTORIAL EXCESS OR ADDRESS
OFFICIAL MALFEASANCE

While, as discussed supra at "Orders and Injunctive
Authorities," legal authority to conduct effective investigation
and legal tools to assure a strong, behavior-changing response
are critical aspects of effective environmental legislation, the
exercise of such authorities, and use of such tools should be
responsible, fair, and consistent with the rights of affected persons and entities. These are considerable powers, and therefore
susceptible to considerable abuse.
An independent judiciary provides a mechanism for
accountability and oversight that can both deter misuse of
enforcement power and correct and redress such misuse when it
occurs. The courts may establish practices or implement legislative provisions that prevent the use of wrongly obtained evidence,79 that impose sanctions on offending officers or agencies,80 and that provide compensation to wronged individuals or
entities.81 By these express measures and a myriad of specific
approaches as matters come before the courts, judges can establish the tone for the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial
discretion and for professionalism and ethical standards in environmental law enforcement.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ASSURING THE
TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

While the statutory availability of adequate enforcement
mechanisms is a necessary starting point and the capacity and
will to exercise these authorities is prerequisite, the courts provide the ultimate recourse where there is resistance to investigation and unwillingness on the part of the regulated community
to comply with the demands of the enforcement authorities. In
the absence of a judicial backstop, both intransigent violators
and those who are generally responsive to clear governmental
action but unwilling to comply without credible government
enforcement,83 will likely continue to violate. If the involvement of the judiciary leads to inordinate delays,84 major unpredictability, or a perception of corruption or incompetence, the
judicial backstop is essentially nullified.
As part of a system that permits and promotes effective
environmental law compliance, a credible and capable judiciary
is crucial. In certain specific situations, such as a refusal of
access to inspectors, emergency conditions, or persistent intransigence by violators, strong and swift judicial action may be
essential to the integrity of both the particular enforcement situation and the overall program for compliance with environmental law. In the more comprehensive context of the complete
docket of environmental enforcement matters that come before
the judiciary, a consistent, fair, and sufficiently forceful
9

response to demonstrated violations becomes a foundation of
the entire system of environmental law enforcement.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE OVERALL
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS OF ENFORCEMENT

Although statutory provisions and choices by implementing
enforcement agencies generally control the extent and nature of
the overall transparency and openness of a government's
approach to compliance and enforcement, there are a number of
mechanisms through which the courts can contribute to these
important aspects of sound environmental law compliance programs. Court systems often, for example, control the manner
and extent to which cases are publicly reported and the ease with
which they can be accessed by practitioners and others.85 Courts
can support and even undertake efforts to compile information
about cases and decisions and to analyze trends or patterns in
them.86 These kinds of efforts may be particularly important in
code-based legal systems which may lack the long history of
ready availability of relevant prior court decisions.87

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDGES
AND OTHER LAW-MAKERS

TRAINING AND SKILLS ENHANCEMENT

As a starting point for skills development, law school curricula would benefit greatly from enhanced attention to statutory and regulatory drafting, including enforceability considerations.88 Specialized continuing education and training for
law-makers in drafting of substantive provisions for enforceability and in development of adequate statutory enforcement
provisions is available, but relatively rare.89 Judicial training
is increasingly organized, expected, and enhanced in the
U.S.,90 though it has not been without controversy. Other
nations also make extensive use of judicial training programs
and institutions.91
Because environmental cases can be very complex in both
law and facts, judges might also benefit from some specialized
training in the subject-matter of environmental protection.92
While "environmental courts" are quite rare,93 sub-specialization within a court is a somewhat more frequent phenomenon,
either explicitly or informally.94 Usually, though, environmental
cases are likely to be assigned in a less systematic way and it
becomes important that the whole judiciary be better prepared to
understand and act responsibly in environmental cases.95 A
number of recent international initiatives are attempting to promote this kind of subject-matter awareness-raising and training
for judges, nationally, regionally, and world-wide.96

NETWORKING

Interaction, cooperation, and collaboration among professionals with similar responsibilities, challenges, and experience
can be both useful and personally satisfying. Networking across
organizational, political, jurisdictional, or geographic boundaries can provide an efficient, nonbureaucratic mechanism for
shared learning and skills development.
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At the international level, a rich and growing body of literature now identifies international networks of various types of
government officials and others with language as strong as a
"new world order."97 These kind of networks can and do operate
among legislators, agency personnel, and judges98 and can operate at the international, national, or subnational level. While
organized activities among legislators or judges are increasing,
especially at the international level,99 networking around a specific substantive area of the law is still relatively rare. Happily,
environmental law is emerging as a leading area for international judicial networking. When one reflects on the fact that there
are only a small handful of specialized environmental courts of
any type in any nation and that neither civil nor criminal dockets
are by any means dominated by environmental cases, this level
of international judicial engagement is somewhat extraordinary.
A group of more than one hundred and thirty judges from more
than 60 countries met in Johannesburg on the eve of the World
Summit on Sustainable Development and produced a "Statement
of Principles" relating to justice and the environment,100 a truly
unusual development in the history of foreign affairs.
The Johannesburg meeting of the jurists followed on the
labors of the Division of Policy Development and Law of the
United Nations Environment Program, which had been working
for several years in regional judicial symposia and other meetings, and has been followed by several other, mostly regional
gatherings of judges, some quite prominent, who appear committed to judicial networking on environmental topics.101
Among the topics of evident interest to these judicial networks
is enforcement and compliance. This robust model of international judicial networking in the area of environmental law
enforcement can serve as a model for similar international,
national, or subnational networking among legislators, regulatory drafters, permit writers, and all other types of actors in the
area of environmental law enforcement.102

EXPORTATION OF BEST PRACTICES

Successful models from other systems or experiences can
be adopted or adapted if and when certain preconditions are met.
The "best practices", in this instance for law-drafting and judging, must be known and understood by those who might adopt
them, must be adaptable to the "importing" situation, and must
be sufficiently admired and respected to receive a fair and full
consideration. Education and training (supra at "Training and
Skills Enhancement") and networking (supra at "Networking")
contribute to these preconditions. So do all the means by which
the activities of law drafters and judges are made transparent
(infra at "Feedback, Accountability, and Measurement") and
supported by legislative or regulatory histories and other amplifying materials (supra at "The Balancing Role of the Judiciary
to Moderate Prosecutorial Excess or Address Official
Malfeasance").
Fortunately, most legislative and regulatory materials, as
well as many individual permits, are typically publicly available
and easy to access. Some developing countries and systems without fully developed judicial administrations may not routinely
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and comprehensively publish judicial decisions, but a large volume of "judge-made law" is also widely and readily available
from throughout the world. It only remains, then for comparative
environmental law studies to focus on enforcement and enforceability issues. Judges also have the option and the opportunity to
turn to extra-territorial sources for relevant and useful models
and sources of law, insight, reasoning, or perspective.103

FEEDBACK, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND MEASUREMENT

As noted, supra at "The Judiciary as Law-Maker," judges
perform a form of feedback and accountability function for
environmental law drafters and for environmental enforcement
agencies which can contribute in major ways to the overall credibility and effectiveness of the system. In a more judiciary-specific way, courts, judges, and the judicial system can adopt
mechanisms and processes which provide feedback to the judiciary and which improve accountability and measurement of
judicial effectiveness. For example, the judicial system can
track and report on such measures as time to decision, frequency of reversal by higher courts, back-logs of undecided cases,
and the like. Academic and other independent institutions can be
encouraged to study and evaluate the judiciary.104 All of these
approaches can be adapted with particular attention to judging
in environmental cases and environmental issues.105

CONCLUSION

Effective law enforcement and reliable compliance with
environmental laws are necessary if environmental protection
efforts are to produce their desired results. This article has identified the critical role that lawmakers, both as drafters and
judges, can and should play in promoting environmental compliance. While other governmental and non-governmental
actors are often the primary focus of thinking, scholarship, and
writing about environmental compliance and enforcement, the
particulars identified and elaborated here illustrate the fundamental foundation function of law-making and the rich opportunities for judges and other lawmakers to promote and enhance
environmental law compliance and environmental protection
throughout the world.
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administrative agency, perhaps to an administrative tribunal whose functions are separate from the enforcement arm of the agency. See United
States Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (provision that the
adjudicating agency official not be responsible to or subject to the officials
engaged in enforcement functions).
38 See General Electric Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 360 F.3d 188

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that while the plain language of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) prohibits federal courts from reviewing challenges to
removal or remedial actions under the statute, General Electric still can sue
in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of that provision of the
statute). But see also McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47
F.3d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1995); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th
Cir. 1990); Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380,
1390 (5th Cir. 1989) for examples of courts declining to review challenges
to specific EPA orders and actions under the same provisions.
39 For examples of some conditions that the federal courts may attach to
probation, see 2002 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Chapter 5-Part BProbation, available at www.ussc.gov/2002guid/5b1_3.htm (last visited
April 9, 2004).
40 Consider six U.S. federal environmental statutes containing emergency
or imminent hazard provisions. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603;
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
42 U.S.C. § 9606; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364; Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973; Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300i; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
41 For a discussion of deterrence theory see Deterrence vs. Cooperation,

supra note 11 at 118 (critically examining the assumptions underlying the
reform movement and suggesting that instead of discarding the current
enforcement approach based on the traditional deterrence-based civil
enforcement, there should be movement towards a system of environmental enforcement grounded in deterrence theory and which integrates the
constructive features of a cooperative model); Jon D. Silberman, Does
Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Says Yes, But
We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 ENVTL.L.REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at
10523 (2000) (summarizing EPA’s traditional deterrence-based approach
to enforcement); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable
Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 63-7, 118-20 (2003) (discussing the standard deterrence model). For a comprehensive analysis of the literature of regulatory
compliance, see Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance, and the
Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451 (2003).
42 Some U. S. environmental statutes expressly identify economic benefit
derived from the violation as a factor in setting of penalties. See, e.g.,
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and (g)(3). Under EPA policies, EPA
fines in civil enforcement cases have two components, (1) the violator’s
economic gains from non-compliance and (2) “a punitive ‘gravity-based’
penalty based on the seriousness of the offense.” Since 1984 EPA has used
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the BEN computer model to calculate economic benefits. An economic
benefit can occur through “delaying required pollution control measures,
avoiding required pollution control expenditures, or gaining an illegal
competitive advantage such as selling a product at below market prices.”
Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of Economic Benefits
Obtained by Violators under Review, in NEWSLETTER VOL. III #11
(November 1996) (available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/Epalib/
nwlet.nsf/0/716462cbcb29cfef8525653a00064db7?OpenDocument) (last
visited April 1, 2004). For a judicial discussion of the economic benefit
factor, see U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, 191 F. 3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
43 See discussion of order authorities supra Section “Compliance Orders.”

44 For a detailed discussion comparing administrative and judicial
enforcement in the U.S. and Dutch systems see D.J. Van Zeben & M.E.
Mulkey, Choosing Among Criminal, Civil Judicial, and Administrative
Enforcement Options: A Comparative Discussion of United States and
Netherlands Experience, available at http://www.inece.org/2ndvol1/
vzeben.htm (last visited April 1, 2004) [hereinafter Choosing].
45 Compare the statutory penalty criteria of the U. S. Clean Water Act,

which enumerates five factors plus “such other matters as justice may
require,” CWA 33 U.S.C. §1318(d) and the criteria of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, which enumerates four factors relating to the violation and an
additional four factors relating to the violator along with “such other matters as justice may require.” Environmental agencies may elect to publish
detailed penalty policies. For general information about the EPA’s penalty
policies, see EPA, CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES, available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/penalty (last visited April 9, 2004). For an example of policies at the state level, see STATE
OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CIVIL
PENALTY POLICIES, available at http://dep.state.ct.us/enf/policies/civpenpol.pdf (last visited April 9, 2004). Enforcement agencies also could be
legislatively required to publish more detailed penalty policies or schedules of typical penalties, and there could also be requirements for publication of all penalty cases in some systematic way.
46 See supra note 42 (discussing role of economic benefit in U.S. envi-

ronmental penalty law and policies and the EPA computer model to calculate economic benefit). For more information on recapturing economic
benefits see David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter:
Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89
CAL.L.REV. 917, 937 (2001) (stating that EPA’s penalty policies are intended to represent the economic benefit of noncompliance, but some courts
hesitate to apply these penalty policies and “the application of civil penalty policy. . . by administrative law judges is yet more uneven”).
47 Pursuant to section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment

Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461, as amended by the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 3701, each U.S. federal agency is
required to issue regulations adjusting for inflation the maximum civil
monetary penalties that can be imposed pursuant to such agency statutes.
The most recent EPA regulations implementing these provisions are codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 19 and 27. See also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
7651(j)(c) (2000) (requiring annual adjustments for inflation of penalties in
that section).
48 If crimes are categorized, as, e.g . felony and misdemeanor, then it may

be necessary to state which categories are applicable to which violations.
With the increasing complexity of both environmental and criminal laws,
more specification by lawmakers becomes necessary. See generally Martin
Harrell, Why Eight Plus Six Means Prison for Environmental Criminals, 14
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, n.1, n.35 (2000) (noting that the U. S. Sentencing
Guidelines’ offense calculation is similar for environmental felonies and
misdemeanors, only differing on the grounds that a misdemeanor conviction would carry a maximum penalty of one year prison term while a felony
conviction would carry a prison term greater than one year).
49 E.g., Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (civil penalties) and (c) (criminal penalties); Clear Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (civil penalties) and
(c) (criminal penalties). For a broad range of information about environmental crimes in U.S. environmental law, see RONALD J. BURNS &
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MICHAEL J. LYNCH, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: A SOURCEBOOK (LFB
Scholarly Publishing 2004).
50 See Choosing, supra note 44 (noting that Dutch civil courts were available

for use by the government enforcement authorities only when the government
can identify a cause of action based on private law, such as tort or contract.
Therefore, the primary monetary sanction available in civil courts was the
recovery of costs expended by the government in response to a negligent or
otherwise tortuous act by a polluter). For a discussion of the dominant role
played by criminal environmental enforcement in the Netherlands, see Gisele
Van Zeben, Enforcement of Environmental Legislation Under Criminal Law
by the Public Prosecutions Department in the Netherlands, available at
www.inece.org/3rdvol1/pdf/zeben.pdf (last visited April 9, 2004).
51 Of course, in legal systems that include the ultimate sanction of loss of
life (capital punishment), certain environmental violations of the most
egregious and deliberate sort, with extreme results, might be subject to this
ultimate sanction.
52 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Assistant Attorney

General, to Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys,
January 20, 2003, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00161.htm (last visited April 9, 2004)
(describing principles of federal prosecution of business organizations).
53 The United States Sentencing Commission publishes a comprehensive

Guidelines Manual with detailed approaches to sentencing applicable in
the federal courts. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, (Nov. 2003). Part Q of the MANUAL addresses offenses involving
the environment. For an example of U. S. State-level sentencing guidelines, see MASSACHUSETTS SENTENCING COMMISSION, MASSACHUSETTS
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1998) available at www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/sentencing/intro.html (last visited April 9, 2004).
54 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Suspension and
Disbarment, available at www.epa.gov/ogd/grants/debarment.htm (last
visited April 9, 2004) (providing that “[s]uspension and Debarment actions
prevent companies and individuals from participating in government contracts, subcontracts, loans, grants and other assistance programs”). See 40
C.F.R. Pt. 32 for a regulation on statutory debarment under the Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act.
55 See Choosing, supra note 44 (noting that Dutch administrative law had
no mechanism for imposing penalty sanctions for past environmental violations, but that administrative tools such as license revocation and facility shutdown can provide significant sanctions for past violations).
56 The U.S. pesticides law, for example, has provisions for the termination
of licenses to sell or distribute pesticides. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §136d (providing for orders to Stop Sale and Use of pesticides); FIFRA, §136k(a)
(providing for seizure and confiscation of pesticides when certain conditions are met) FIFRA §136k(b). The Toxic Substances Control Act provides a mechanism for the seizure and condemnation of chemical substances or products manufactured, processed or sold in violation of the Act.
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2616(b).
57 See supra, notes 22 and 23.

58 For a reasonably comprehensive discussion of the common law in contemporary U.S. environmental law, see PLATER ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY, Chapter 3 (West Group
Publishers, 2nd ed. 1998). For a general discussion of citizens’ suits, see
Katherine M. Bailey, Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement
in Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study, 16 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL L. REV. 323 (2004).
59 Examples of citizen suit provisions can be found in the U.S. Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604; Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619; Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g); Resource Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a). See Eileen. Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions:
Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995). See also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundations, Inc. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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60 For example, the U.S. Clear Water Act citizens’ suits may be brought by

“any citizen on his own behalf” and “citizen” is defined as “a person or
persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” CWA
33 U.S.C. §1365 (a) and (g).
61 For example, U.S. Endangered Species Act citizen suits may be com-

menced “to enjoin any person . . . alleged to be in violation” ESA, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) while the Clean Air Act provision provides that in citizens’ suits, courts have jurisdiction to “enforce such a . . . standard . . . and
to apply any appropriate civil penalties.” CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (a).
62 Most of the U.S. environmental statutes’ citizen suits provisions authorize suits against any person alleged to have violated provisions of the Act
and against the implementing Agency based on an allegation of failure to
perform non-discretionary duties. See, for example, CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§7604(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
63 Citizens’ suits provisions in U.S. environmental law typically provide for

the award of “costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees)” RCRA , 42 U.S.C. §6972(e) or “costs of suit and reasonable
fees for attorneys and expert witnesses” TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2). For
an example of a more “generic” approach to the award of attorneys fees, see
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1981), which
allows prevailing parties in a wide range of actions to recover attorney fees
and costs in litigation against the federal government. For an overview of
EAJA see generally, Robert Hogfoss, The Equal Access to Justice Act and
its Effect on Environmental Litigation, 15 ENVTL. L 533 (1985).
64 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 478 (2003) (providing a history of the debate
between formalists and progressives, including such figures as Langdell,
Llewellyn, Marshall, Cardozo, Holmes, Scalia, Bork and Easterbrook,
among many others).
65 See e.g. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS at
16-17, 113-115, 129 (1921) (describing the duty of the judiciary to fill in
legislative gaps and create a cohesive body of law); Roger Traynor,
Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV 401, 402
(1968) (“the hydra-headed problem is how to synchronize the unguided
missiles launched by legislatures with a going system of common law”).
66 Defined as “an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
67 Defined as “the doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a

court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again
in litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
68 Even though France, which operates under the code system, does not
expressly allow judges to decide a case based on precedent, prior decisions
are becoming more persuasive. See THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE ART. 5(c)(2)
(French judges “are forbidden, when giving judgment in the cases which
are brought before them . . . to decide a case by holding it was governed
by a previous decision”). But see John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1997) (book review)[hereinafter Comparing
Precedent] (noting that although precedent is not considered binding in
civil law countries, it is still very important in France, where lawyers
extensively discuss cases in their briefs).
69 See James L. Oaks, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 NYU

L. REV. 498, 512 (1977)[hereinafter The Judicial Role] (explaining that
Congress has given the courts a very significant role in environmental law,
and arguing that the court must recognize this duty and act upon it).
70 See Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm’r, U.S. E.P.A., 564 F.Supp 552 (D.C.

Mo. 1983), (reversed by Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862
(1984)) (district court holding the consideration of data submitted by producer in connection with application for pesticide registration pursuant to
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act caused unconstitutional taking of producer’s property; Supreme Court rejected the “takings
claim”).
71 This is a basic element of U.S. law. See 5 U.S.C. 702 (providing a per-

son “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to
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judicial review thereof”). See also Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that a court must uphold any reasonable administrative interpretation of a statute unless that is clearly contrary to legislative text or intent).
72 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F); Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b)§ 7006(b).
73 See e.g. The Judicial Role, supra note 69 at 514 (discussing the great
service that courts provide to environmental law by clarifying the often
hyper-scientific language that agencies use which “makes environmental
decisions more comprehensible to those who must ultimately pay the costs
of implementation”).
74 While in the short term, judicial identification of limitations to the
enforceability of legal requirements may appear to limit or constrain
enforcement, it can have the effect of motivating law drafters to establish
clearer and more enforceable requirements.
75 See John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of

Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179 (1984) [hereinafter
Cooperation] (discussing the link between the willingness to cooperate by
regulated firms and their confidence that the system will address other
intransigents).
76 Obviously, other elements of the society, including those engaged in

activities that may contribute to environmental degradation, must also
operate in a trustworthy and upright manner if environmental protection
programs are to succeed. The prospect for such behavior, however, is inextricably tied to the quality and ethic of the society at large and of the governments who wield its collective power.
77 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)

(where Justice Frankfurter stated “The Court’s authority- possessed of neither the purse nor the sword- ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”); Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)
(Justice Blackmun reasoned “the legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship”);
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS at 5
(Nelson-Hall Inc, 1997) (discussing the importance of courts being trusted
and respected by the citizenry).
78 See e.g. Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375

(D.C. Cir 1973) (court had to balance competing interests of industry
groups (who thought that new standards were too stringent) and environmental groups (who thought the standards not stringent enough)); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (industry in opposition of regulation of lead contents in gasoline, while the environmentalists were in support of regulation).
79 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is constitutionally
inadmissible in state courts).
80 In the U.S. system, constitutional torts are actions brought against gov-

ernments and their officials and employees for violation of federal constitutional rights. Tens of thousands of these actions are filed each year in federal court. Almost all are brought against state and local governments and
their officials and employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A few such
cases are brought against federal officials, relying on the decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a thorough treatment of constitutional torts, see SHELDON NAHMOD ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (Anderson Pub. Co. 1995).
81 For a discussion of constitutional torts, see supra note 80.

83 See Cooperation, supra note 75.
84 See The Judicial Role, supra note 769 at 507 (explaining that there is
often an additional sense of urgency in environmental law, and for that reason it behooves the courts to handle cases quickly).
85 For an understanding of the legal framework for reporting of U.S. judicial

decisions, see Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-54 (1888) (Supreme
Court ruled that judicial decisions were the property of the people and therefore could not be copyrighted); Marci A Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen,
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The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the
Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 289 (2003) (providing
historical perspective on the law of reporting court decisions).
86 For an example of such a study, see William P. Adams & Mark

Motivans, Using Data from the Federal Justice Statistics Program, 16 FED.
SENT. R. 18, 18 (2003). This article discusses the Federal Justice Statistics
Program, which obtains data from numerous sources, and then compiles
the data to assess trends and provide comprehensive information about the
federal criminal justice program Id. Among the groups that provides these
data is the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Id.
87 See Comparing Precedent, supra note 68 at 1248 (noting that
although precedent is not considered binding in civil law countries, it is
still very important in Germany (where almost every decision makes reference to precedent) and France (where lawyers discuss cases extensively in their briefs)).
88 See Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the

Classroom and the Courtroom, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 663 n.76 (1987) (suggesting that lack of law school instruction in statutory drafting stems from
a lack of faculty expertise in that subject); Lance W. Rook, Laying Down
the Law: Canons for Drafting Complex Litigation, 72 OR. L. REV. 663,
n.11 (1993) (discussing link between unclear drafting and lack of drafting
instruction in law schools); Robert F. Williams, Statutory Law in Legal
Education: Still Second Class After All These Years, 35 MERCER L. REV.
803 (1984) (describing the overall lack of statutory drafting classes in law
schools around the United States). The Georgetown University Law
School, for example, does offer such a class, entitled Legislative Drafting
Seminar.
Information
about
this
class
available
at
www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm?status=Course&C
ourseNumber=312 (last visited April 9, 2004). The George Washington
Law School also offers such a class, entitled Legislative Analysis and
Drafting, available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/acad/400426.asp (last visited April 4, 2004). One suspects their location in Washington, D.C. to play
a role in this curriculum. Despite the rich mix of course offerings at U.S.
law schools, this kind of course title rarely appears.
89 For examples of international legislative drafting aids, see International

Legislative Drafting Institute, available at www.law.tulane.edu/cdo/
index.cfm?d=inst&main=ildi.htm (last visited April 9, 2004) (two week
summer program that focuses on legislative drafting that has graduated
drafting personnel from 75 jurisdictions worldwide); The World Bank
Group, Drafting Techniques, available at www4.worldbank.org/legal/
legalr/legalreform_dt_ul.html (last visited April 9, 2004) (providing links
to different drafting aids, including online drafting resources, drafting references, and information about drafting legislature in countries such as
Mongolia, South Africa, Sweden, China, and more); Online Drafting
Manuals and Aids, available at www.ili.org/ld/manuals.htm (last visited
April 9, 2004) (providing legislative drafting manuals for Australia, China,
India, the UK, and different jurisdictions within the United States).
90 See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM, available

at www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/judicialreform_jt.html (last visited
April 9, 2004) (listing 13 judicial training institutions in the United States).
For a specific example, see University of Georgia, Institute of Continuing
Judicial Education, available at www.uga.edu/icje/index.htm (last visited
April 9, 2004) (providing an overview of this specific program).
91 See, e.g., European Judicial Training Network, available at
www.ejtn.net/www/en/html/index.htm (last visited April 9, 2004) (describing
training and opportunities to network for judges in the European Union); The
World Bank Group, Legal and Judicial Reform, available at www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/judicialreform_jt.html (last visited April 9, 2004) (listing
over 80 judicial training institutions in 50 countries); Linn Hammergren,
Judicial
Training
and
Judicial
Reform,
available
at
http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACD021.pdf (last visited April 9, 2004)
(providing summary of lessons learned by U.S. Agency for International
Development while implementing judicial reform projects in Latin America).
92 There has been a concerted effort to organize structures through which

judges can network, and learn about, international issues in environmental
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law. These groups include The European Training Network (“ETJN”)
(homepage at www.etjn.net); The United Nations Environmental
Programme (“UNEP”), which has held symposia for judges about the role
of law in sustainable development (homepage at www.unep.org, last visited
April 9, 2004); and the International Network for Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement (“INECE”), which has held meetings for
judges world wide (homepage at www.inece.org, last visited April 9, 2004).
93 See Andrew Allan, A Comparison Between the Water Law Reforms in

South Africa and Scotland: Can a Generic National Water Law Model be
Developed from These Examples?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 419, 484 (2003)
(explaining the South Australia environmental court, which can hear
claims on all environmental matters); Bret C. Birdsong, Adjudicating
Sustainability: New Zealand’s Environment Court, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(detailing the specialized, expert court that focuses entirely on resolving
environmental issues in New Zealand); Sean D. Murphy, Does the World
Need a New International Environmental Court?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L
L. & ECON. 333, 333 (2000) (discussing proposals for an international
environmental court). Within the United States, at the local level, some
counties have set up specialized environmental courts. See Westchester
Starts Environmental Court, 3/16/2001 N.Y.L.J. 4, (col. 4) (detailing the
implementation of a specialized court in Westchester, NY, staffed with
experts, that deals solely with civil environmental cases); Larry E. Potter,
The Environmental Court of Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee: The
Past, the Present and the Future, 29 GA. L. REV. 313, 316 (1995) (describing the specialized environmental court in Memphis).
94 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM (1996) (expressing reservations about specialization in courts);
Leroy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology
Cases, L. Tech. J. 1, available at www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.pdf (last visited April 9, 2004) (advocating
increased specialization of United States federal courts to more effectively
deal with technological and intellectual property rights triggered by the
internet) David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Require Specialized Courts (and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist
Judges)?, COURT REVIEW 22 (Spring 2000) (discussing in detail the pros
and cons of specialized courts).
95 See The Judicial Role, supra note 69 at 512-13 (describing the role of
generalist United States federal judges in adjudicating environmental
issues).
96 For information about the international environmental networks of
judges, see supra note 92.
97 For an overview of the concept of the Real New World Order, as

espoused by Anne-Marie Slaughter, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global
Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L, 1041 [hereinafter Global Government]
(2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real
New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, 183. These papers detail
the growth of international networks of government institutions that cover
complete disciplines, such as economics or law.
98 Examples of such networks include The Basel Committee on Banking

Johannesburg Summit, available at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/
html/documents/documents.html (last visited April 9, 2004).
101 There have been many such meetings, including: Judicial Symposium

on Environmental Law, Policy and Access to Justice- Jinja, Uganda (2001)
(www.eli.org/research/education.htm); First Conference on the Role of the
Judiciary in the Development of Environmental Law in the Arab RegionKuwait (2002) (http://inece.org/newsletter/8/enforcement_judges.html);
Judges
Ad
Hoc
MeetingNairobi,
Kenya
(2003)
(www.unep.org/dpdl/symposium/); China (2002) (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/19/eng20020819_101700.shtml); Adelaide House
(2002)
(http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/London%20
Bridge%20Statement.pdf).
102 INECE’s website explains “INECE is a network of government and
non-government enforcement and compliance practitioners from over 100
countries. INECE’s goals are: raising awareness to compliance and
enforcement; developing networks for enforcement cooperation; and
strengthening capacity to implement and enforce environmental requirements.” http://www.inece.org/. To that end, INECE holds meetings and
workshops, creates networks, and drafts rules and papers.
103 See Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law: The

2002-2003 Term of the Supreme Court, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155 (discussing
the debate about the role of international law authority in Supreme Court
cases). See also Anne Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to High
Court, Scalia Says, WASH. POST, April 3, 2004, at A7.
104 See Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence

by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053,
1064-68 (2002) (describing the various judicial evaluation indices, including bar and media polls, state evaluation systems, and the ABA Guidelines
for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance); James Andrew Wynn, Jr.,
Judging the Judges, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 769 (2003) (describing state
(Alaska, Colorado, Utah and Arizona) evaluation systems that use the
opinions of litigants, lawyers, police officers, jurors and court personnel to
measure each judge’s ability in areas such as “integrity, impartiality, legal
knowledge, and administrative skills”). There is also a wealth of law
review literature that assesses specific courts based on various factors. See
e.g. Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices, 76 TEMP. L.REV. 209, 209
(assessing the Rehnquist Court based on factors such as quality of written
opinions, ability to produce coherent jurisprudence and overall deportment). For a collection of articles evaluating the topic of judicial independence and accountability, see 61-Sum LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1998) (an issue composed entirely of articles addressing this topic).
105 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant?, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 547, 547 (1997) (positing that the United States Supreme Court has
shied away from deciding important environmental issues and as a whole
has contributed only minimally to the discipline).

Supervision, The International Organization of Securities Commissioners,
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the Financial
Stability Forum. See Global Government, supra note 97 at 1046-47.
99 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.

181, 203 (1996) (describing the application of the “Real New World
Order” to international law and networks). See also supra note 93 for some
specific international legal organizations. Another example is the
International Association of Lesbian & Gay Judges, homepage available at
http://home.att.net/~ialgi/ialgjbody.html (last visited April 2, 2004).
100 See David M. Dreisen, Thirty Years of International Environmental
Law: A Retrospective and Plea for Reinvigoration, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L
& COM. 353, 363 (2003) (describing steps taken at Johannesburg conference); for copies of documents produced at the Johannesburg Summit, see
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THE INECE INDICATORS PROJECT:

IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT THROUGH
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
by Kenneth J. Markowitz* and Krzysztof Michalak†

F

INTRODUCTION

or many years, policy makers and analysts have used
environmental indicators to assess and report on pressures and the state of the environment. However, indicators of policy responses to environmental problems, and in particular those related to enforcement and non-compliance
actions, have not been well developed. Responding to this need,
the International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement ("INECE")1 launched a project to develop
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement ("ECE")
Indicators at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
("WSSD") in 2002.
The ECE Indicators will be used to evaluate capabilities
and effectiveness of environmental compliance and enforcement programs at national, regional, and international levels.
They will also serve as a tool for communicating government
actions to decision-makers and the general public and helping to
identify training, technology, and funding resources. While the
indicators will be scaled to accommodate needs of countries at
varying levels of development, their ultimate aim is to achieve
sustainable development goals through improved environmental
governance on national, regional and global scales. This article
provides background information on the project development
process, describes progress to date, and concludes with potential
future steps.

BACKGROUND

There is a significant body of knowledge and experience
concerning environmental indicators, which may be defined as
"parameters, or values derived from parameters, which point to,
provide information about, or describe the state of a phenomenon/environment/area, with a significance extending beyond
that directly associated with a parameter value."2 Over the past
decade, many countries have begun to adapt the concept of indicators for measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of environment enforcement programs.3 Environmental compliance
and enforcement indicators aid enforcement agencies and practitioners by:
• Assisting in monitoring enforcement operations and
non-compliance responses, to help ensure that personnel and resources are being used effectively.

• Enhancing program accountability by providing
information to decision-makers and the public
about the number, type, and impacts of enforcement
operations.
17

• Helping to assess the performance of environmental
compliance and enforcement programs.

These indicators help program managers learn what is
working and what is not working and determine what needs to
be done differently to achieve desired results.4 Such indicators
have been in use in some countries but their methodological
base has not been well developed and their application not widespread. Several countries have expressed an interest to carry
comprehensive analysis and enlarge the scope of using ECE
indicators.5
The INECE project responds to this need by creating a framework for identifying, designing, and using indicators that respond
to the implementation, enforcement, and compliance with environmental laws in developed, transitional, and developing
nations.6 The ECE Indicators Project builds on one of INECE's
major publications, the internationally cited Principles of
Environmental Enforcement,7 which emphasizes the importance
of evaluating program success and establishing accountability.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The development of ECE Indicators will be guided by criteria selected based on best practices around the world. These criteria include transparency in development and in use, informative value for a range of users, comparability between developed
and developing countries, relevance to current policies and country resource systems, credibility and flexibility measurements,
compatibility with existing reporting requirements, technological
sophistication, and measurability (cost-effectiveness).8 This will
facilitate the use of the ECE Indicators in conjunction with other
existing environmental and sustainability indexes.9
The ECE Indicators will be designed for a wide range of
applications, such as measuring compliance promotion, compliance monitoring, and non-compliance response within regional,
national, and international enforcement programs. A secondary
application for the ECE Indicators will provide a more global
view towards gauging steps taken to achieve specific sustainable development commitments, agreed to by the governments
*Ken Markowitz is the President of Earthpace LLC, and a consultant to INECE.
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BOX 1: KEY PRINCIPLES RESULTING FROM THE
INECE-OECD WORKSHOP
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Carefully consider and reflect on the needs of different user
groups.
Meet the challenges of decision-making and program management
Link indicators to policy targets and ensure that indicators
are responsive to evolving policy objectives
Reflect and address factors that determine compliance
Help track progress in solving priority problems
Recognize that indicators must be interpreted correctly and
meaningfully.
Use different categories of indicators in conjunction to
maximize their value

in
the
Johannesburg
Plan
of
Implementation.10 Achieving the sustainable development goals requires good governance, the rule of law, and effective, consistently applied, enforcement. Effective
enforcement calls for measuring actions
taken to achieve full compliance against a
baseline and reporting them openly. ECE
Indicators are one method to meet this need.
Since INECE launched the Indicators
Project in 2002, INECE participants have
researched and surveyed existing environmental indicators programs worldwide, set
up an Expert Working Group to guide the
project, and presented the concept at conferences and workshops to solicit feedback and
identify partnerships.
In November 2003, INECE and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") co-hosted an
international workshop on the subject. The
workshop was attended by representatives
from developed, transitional, and developing countries; international organizations;
multilateral environmental agreement secretariats; and nongovernmental organizations.
Participants outlined several guiding principles for the development of ECE Indicators
(see Box 1) and developed three major recommendations11 for next steps in the ECE
Indicator development process:

Conventionally, environmental authorities measure
enforcement capacities or activity levels using "input" and "output" indicators. Input-related indicators (e.g., the number of
inspectors and the enforcement agency budgets) identify the
allocation of financial and human resources, while output-related indicators (e.g., the number of inspections and enforcement
actions) show the extent of activities carried out.13 However, as
Michael Stahl of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") discusses, although "these [traditional] indicators give
some sense of enforcement presence, they do not provide all the
types of feedback needed to effectively manage program performance, and they have several limitations."14
Countries are now developing "intermediate outcome" indicators and "outcome" indicators. Changes in behavior, knowledge, or conditions that result from enforcement program activ-

TABLE 1: BASIC TYPES OF ECE INDICATORS
Indicato

Measures

ECE Examples

Input
Indicator

Resources (human, material,
financial, etc.) used to carry
out activities, produce outputs
and/or accomplish results.16

- # of staff assigned to a task
- $ spent per inspection
- Ratio of # of staff to # of regulated facilities

Output
Indicator

Government activities, work
products, or actions.17

- # of enforcement cases
settled per year
- # of fines issued per year

Intermediate
Outcome
Indicator

Measure progress towards
achieving final outcomes, such
as changes in behavior, knowledge, or conditions that result
from program activities.18

- pounds of pollutants reduced
through enforcement actions

Outcome
Indicator

The real impacts of compliance promotion and enforcement actions19 and the ultimate change in the state of the
environment

- improved water quality
- improved air quality

(1) Develop common definitions.

(2) Reach agreement on a methodology model.

(3) Articulate and apply guiding principles for using
indicators to assess performance, through incountry projects.12
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WHAT ARE ECE INDICATORS AND WHAT DO
THEY MEASURE?

ities15 are examples of "intermediate outcome" indicators. They
should help to measure progress towards achieving final outcomes - the ultimate changes in the state of the environment as
a result of the environmental policies and actions (see Table 1).

ECE INDICATORS IN PRACTICE

At the INECE-OECD Workshop, country representatives
described their efforts to develop more adequate performance
18

indicators. European country representatives discussed the
applicability of outcome indicators to their European Union
reporting requirements. The Netherlands, for example, has
developed a risk-compliance indicator matrix (see Figure 1),
which is used to assess enforcement goals and target inspections.20 The matrix allows the Dutch Inspectorate to focus
resources on priority activities that fall within the upper right
hand corner of the matrix, indicating both a high level of risk to
public health, safety, and the environment and a high potential
for non-compliance.

FIGURE 1: THE NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL
INSPECTORATE RISK-COMPLIANCE MATRIX21
risk

* Clear differentiation of responsibilities between levels of government;

* Development of environmental strategic plans and
systematized environmental compliance and
enforcement programs;
* Prioritization of environmental issues in the public
budget;

* Full implementation of the right to access environmental information, public participation in the decision-making process, and access to justice regarding
environmental issues; and

* Creation of an environmental information system,
which the authorities must organize and implement
to provide information.32

high

FUTURE STEPS

low
low
non-compliance

high

Other country representatives, including those from
Canada22 and Mexico,23 described the development pilot projects in selected areas to measure outputs and outcomes of compliance promotion and enforcement activities. Representatives
from transitional and emerging economies, including those from
Czech Republic,24 Russia,25 Belarus,26 and Thailand,27
described the quantitative "input" and "output" indicators used
in their countries.
Environment Canada has been a leading contributor to the
development of ECE Indicators, launching pilot projects on performance measures for compliance promotion activities in six
program areas, including environmental emergency regulations,
mining, agriculture activities, and volatile organic compounds.
Recently, Environment Canada held a workshop to discuss
results and lessons from these pilot projects. Workshop participants recognized the need to engage stakeholders, including risk
managers and compliance promotion and enforcement officers,
and to ensure that results are analyzed, interpreted, and used to
make decisions and trigger changes along the compliance continuum.28
Country representatives also described the ways in
which indicators are being used to assess performance on a
facility-by-facility basis. In Poland, a list of "worst polluters"
has been used for monitoring compliance and assessing the performance of inspectors.29 In the U.S., the EPA uses the Toxic
Release Inventory as a resource to target inspections.30 In the
Netherlands, the Pollutant Release and Transfer Registry system
is used for the same purpose.31
However, there are many impediments to the establishment of ECE Indicator projects in transitional and developing
countries. Representatives from Argentina, for example, identified legal and institutional development processes that need to
19

occur in their country prior to the creation of an ECE Indicator
program, including:

At the conclusion of the INECE-OECD Workshop, participants discussed future steps to support the development of ECE
Indicators. Participants emphasized that the development of
guiding principles, including a set of common definitions,
methodology, models, and good practices for developing country-specific projects, for the implementation of ECE Indicators
is an important and necessary task.33 In order to assure further
progress in supporting regional and country-specific work, proceedings from the workshop will be published by OECD, as
well as disseminated via the INECE Web site and via email.34
Furthermore, countries with experience in developing ECE
Indicators will pursue in-country projects, while INECE and its
partner organizations will work with other countries to form
new demonstration and pilot projects.35
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FIGHTING BLACK MARKETS AND OILY WATER:
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S NATIONAL INITIATIVES TO COMBAT
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
by Jim Rubin* and Shata Stucky†

I

INTRODUCTION

n recent years, there has been an increase in global attention
paid to transnational environmental crimes. These crimes
include the illegal international trade of environmentally
sensitive materials, such as protected wildlife or ozone depleting substances (“ODS”), and other conduct that violates standards and obligations established by international environmental treaties, such as oil pollution from ocean going vessels.
These crimes support lucrative black markets, estimated in 2000
to be in upwards of $8 billion a year for wildlife and ODS alone,
robbing countries of needed financial and biological resources
and providing outlets for organized crime. They further threaten
the world's biodiversity, atmosphere and oceans, and undermine
the international agreements established to counter these threats.
In the United States, the Department of Justice's
Environment and Natural Resources Division ("ENRD"), with
the assistance of domestic and global partners, has developed a
number of coordinated enforcement initiatives and programs
that have effectively targeted resources to address these crimes.
As a result, ENRD has successfully prosecuted a large number
of transnational environmental crimes, leading to significant
criminal convictions, jail sentences, and fines. This article will
first briefly describe the work of ENRD and its role in federal
enforcement and then provide more detail on ENRD's efforts to
address transnational crime in three areas: smuggling of ODS;
smuggling of protected species; and vessel source pollution.

THE ROLE OF ENRD IN ENFORCEMENT

ENRD is responsible for all environmental and natural
resources related litigation filed on behalf of or against the
United States in federal courts (e.g. laws related to air and water
pollution; solid and hazardous wastes; environmental reviews;
wildlife and ocean resources; land use, planning, and management; and forest, mineral, and energy resources). ENRD has
responsibility for over 10,000 cases filed in all 94 federal judicial districts and employs over 400 attorneys at its headquarters
in Washington, D.C. and in field offices across the country.
These include affirmative enforcement matters (currently 30%
of ENRD's cases) and non-discretionary matters such as defensive litigation and land acquisition. ENRD also works in tandem
with locally based U.S. Attorneys in each of the 94 judicial districts. As will be described below, the relationship between
ENRD and U.S. Attorneys is particularly close in handling cases
involving transnational crime. ENRD is relatively unique
among justice ministries around the world as a large unit
focused exclusively on environmental and natural resource liti21

gation. Among other things, this allows ENRD to develop
expertise in environmental litigation, to better coordinate major
national enforcement initiatives and to maintain consistent positions in litigation. Within ENRD, there are over 30 attorneys
who specialize in prosecuting environmental crime, including
crimes of a transnational nature (ENRD attorneys also handle
civil enforcement as well as defense of federal entities, appellate
matters, land acquisition, and Native American issues). This
article will focus specifically on this aspect of ENRD's work.
In the criminal context, ENRD represents a large number of
federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), the Departments of Interior and Commerce, and the
U.S. Coast Guard ("USCG"), who are responsible in the first
instance for investigating violations of federal environmental
laws. If those investigations lead to referrals to ENRD, the
Division will then decide whether to prosecute a matter. ENRD
does not have its own investigative arm but, as will be described
below, is actively involved in initiatives and building cases from
the very outset with investigators from other agencies. Wherever
possible, if a particular case involves other countries or foreign
conduct, ENRD will seek the cooperation of foreign enforcement
officials either through formal mutual legal assistance treaties
("MLATs"), extradition treaties, or informal cooperation. To bolster this cooperation, ENRD has regularly reached out to other
countries to share information, and, experience, and if requested,
to build capacity for enforcement. Finally, ENRD works with
international organizations such as Interpol, the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), the United
Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"), and the
International Network of Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement Officials ("INECE") to strengthen its own and
other nations' enforcement capabilities and to maintain contacts
for future cases and cooperation.

NATIONAL INITIATIVES TO COMBAT
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Like many other governmental agencies or components,
ENRD faces real pressures to maximize the productivity of its
resources, particularly in the enforcement arena, which as noted
above only constitutes a portion of the Division's budget and
*Jim Rubin is Assistant Chief of the Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Environment and Natural Resources
Division, where he coordinates international environmental matters.
Jim.Rubin@usdoj.gov.
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workload. ENRD has found that through targeting specific types
of crimes, it can make the most effective use of its resources. To
do so, ENRD has developed a number of environmental criminal initiatives and programs, both in the domestic and transnational areas. These efforts share the common elements of discerning national patterns of criminality, sharing data among
domestic and foreign agencies, and ensuring regular communication and training among all relevant enforcement officials.
It should also be noted at the outset that ENRD's transnational crime initiatives and programs owe their success to a
number of institutional elements present at the federal level in
the United States. These include a broad range of meaningful
and effective laws that protect air, water, natural resources, public health, and other interests. Additionally, there are resources
for and there is a political commitment to compliance and
enforcement. Finally, there is a fair, independent, and impartial
judicial system with judges who are informed about environmental laws and the effects of environmental harm. Mandatory

"ENRD has responsibility
for over 10,000 cases filed
in all 94 federal judicial
districts."
sentencing guidelines that cover environmental crimes further
ensure fair, consistent, and meaningful sanctions for violators.
Thus, the U.S. model cannot necessarily be replicated in countries where one or more of these elements is lacking; nonetheless, a focused discussion of these initiatives and programs can
help identify the importance of the underlying institutions and
suggest ways of building capacity to support them.
Below, we shall discuss three particular areas where ENRD
and its partner agencies have developed initiatives and programs
to combat transnational crime. The first two address the illegal
trade in ODS and protected species of wildlife. The third concerns efforts to prevent despoiling of ocean resources by vessel
pollution, primarily from oil. These efforts not only protect the
health of U.S. citizens and their ability to enjoy natural
resources in a sustainable manner, but they also protect the global environment through the promotion of multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs.") ENRD's initiatives and programs
have served as powerful tools for the United States' implementation of several important MEAs to which it is a party. These
agreements lack international enforcement mechanisms and
therefore their successful implementation depends on effective
domestic implementation and enforcement. Finally, we will
briefly detail the importance of developing and utilizing international enforcement networks and contacts to facilitate
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enforcement against transnational crime, and in so doing, further promoting the MEAs that address these problems.

CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS INITIATIVE AND TASK FORCE

ENRD's initiatives to combat crime, including transnational crime, are frequently bolstered by task forces, which consist
of local, state and federal - and sometimes foreign - enforcement
officials. Task forces promote cooperative and consistent efforts
at all levels of government and provide opportunities to gather
and exchange information with others interested in efficient and
systematic enforcement. Additionally, pre-existing task forces
allow for the quick mobilization of investigative, technical, and
legal resources of diverse agencies to respond to serious criminal violations. Below, we will discuss the Chlorofluorocarbons
Initiative, which has made particularly effective use of the task
force concept.
Due to an international phase-out of production and consumption of ODS in industrial nations under the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
("Montreal Protocol"), a vast black market for these chemicals
has developed, estimated in 2000 at between $1-2 billion worldwide. These colorless, odorless gases, which include chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs" such as "Freon," a common refrigerant),
halons, and methyl bromide (a pesticide and agricultural fumigant), are commercially valuable but contribute to the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer that protects the Earth from
harmful ultraviolet radiation. Under the Montreal Protocol, they
can only be manufactured in countries undergoing industrialization until a final phase out in 2010. The consumption of ODS in
industrialized countries, like the United States, is tightly controlled and limited mainly to recycled product and some excepted uses. The price of recycled ODS can be quite high, so there
is a large profit margin for black market chemicals, which move
from countries still allowed to produce the chemical to and
through industrialized countries, where such importation is generally illegal. Moreover, these gases can be transported in small
canisters, are difficult to identify and interdict, and frequently
are fraudulently labeled as "used" product, which can be lawfully sold in some countries like the United States subject to
licensing and tax restrictions.
In the United States, trade in ODS is governed by several
different U.S. laws and regulations. Since 1996, the production
and import of some of the most harmful ODS into the United
States has been prohibited (prior to that date, companies had to
possess "consumption allowances" to import ODS). 40 C.F.R.
§§ 82.4(b-d). However, "used" ODS or ODS stockpiled before
the 1996 ban may lawfully be sold subject to certain licensing
and tax obligations. 26 C.F.R. § 52.4681-1(a)(3), 40 C.F.R. §
82.154(n). Hence, businesses may petition EPA to import recycled or "used" ODS, but cannot import newly manufactured
chemicals. 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.13(g)(2-3).
Violations of these regulations and permit requirements are
enforceable through both civil and criminal judicial proceedings
under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b) and (c).
Criminal penalties include fines and up to five years imprisonment or more for a subsequent conviction. U.S. enforcement
22

officials also use a number of other laws as well to prosecute
violators, including more generic customs laws prohibiting false
records (e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 542, 545), as well as tax laws which
require excise taxes to be paid on imported ODS and reported to
the Internal Revenue Service (26 U.S.C. §§ 4682, 7201, 7203).
Violations of these laws can lead to felony prosecutions, imprisonment and large fines.
To enforce the relevant CAA provisions, ENRD and EPA
have created a task force comprised of federal, state and sometimes foreign enforcement officials to maximize resources, coordinate enforcement, and target specific problem areas. The task
force was created several years ago, after U.S. Customs officials
in Miami alerted ENRD to their region's smuggling problem and
the likelihood that it may be occurring nationwide. ENRD attorneys then assessed the problem by comparing Customs data on
importation of Freon to data on permitted imports of Freon collected by EPA. The analysis indicated twelve geographic areas
with the greatest number of suspicious imports. Working closely with the United States
Attorneys, ENRD then brought
investigators and prosecutors
from those regions together in a
National CFC Enforcement
Meeting to discuss the relevant
laws, regulations, and data and
share experiences in investigations and prosecutions. This
meeting resulted in successful
prosecutions and seizures in six
states and territories and ultimately led to the creation of the
interagency CFC Task Force.
The Task Force is comprised of prosecutors, tax and
customs officials, and criminal
investigators from most major
U.S. ports and representatives
from Canada's law enforcement
and environment agencies. Past participants have also come
from Mexico and the European Union. The task force meets
quarterly to coordinate cases and discuss new information and
developments. These efforts strengthen enforcement by sharing
leads, avoiding overlapping efforts, and using cooperating witnesses and evidence in several different cases. To date, such
efforts have led to 82 cases being indicted, 119 defendants who
have pled guilty or been convicted at trial, over 76 years of
imprisonment (including home detention), and over $70 million
in fines and restitution, including forfeiture of a $2 million mansion and various luxury goods purchased with the proceeds of
illegal ODS transactions. An estimated 16,240,692 pounds of
CFCs have been smuggled into the United States, and nearly
two million pounds have been seized.
In addition to the work of the Task Force, ENRD and EPA
have trained investigators and customs inspectors around the

nation, and, after completing a study of supply and demand of
Freon, issued a nationwide alert informing Customs and IRS
inspectors of the likelihood of increased smuggling activity.
ENRD and EPA officials have also participated in training programs in Mexico through the CEC and around the globe under
the sponsorship of UNEP. These training sessions have allowed
ENRD prosecutors to increase the regulatory and enforcement
capacities of countries that can be the source or conduit of illegal products entering the United States and to develop valuable
contacts for help in specific cases. Additionally, these efforts
have led to greater implementation of the Montreal Protocol.

ENRD'S WILDLIFE PROGRAM

For over 30 years, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") has
regulated the international trade in endangered wildlife and
attempted to stem the significant illegal trade in such species.
The illegal trade in wildlife both animals and plants - has
led to widespread loss of biodiversity and habitat and has
allowed the import of exotic
species and diseases. CITES
seeks to protect endangered
species from international trade
by placing species in appendices, based on the severity of
the threat of extinction. Certain
controls on trade in these
species are required depending
on in which appendix they are
placed. Those species most in
danger of extinction from trade
are listed in Appendix I and are
largely banned from commercial trade. The lawful trade in
other species (Appendix II and
III) must be accompanied by
permits or certificates from the
exporting country. Yet, despite
widespread participation in CITES by the nations of the world,
there is an ever-growing worldwide black market in such
species to supply the markets for pets, zoos, circuses, laboratories, traditional medicine, luxury products, and bush meat.
Illegal trade in mahogany and ramin woods has devastated tropical forests. In 2000, this black market was valued at $6 billion
a year worldwide. The most common forms of illegal trade
involve wildlife smuggled into countries without any CITES
permits or through falsified documents.
In the United States, a number of statutes authorize prosecution of wildlife smugglers. Among the statutes most frequently relied upon for these prosecutions is the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. The ESA generally prohibits the import, export, or sale in interstate or foreign commerce in the course of a commercial activity of any listed endangered or threatened species without a valid permit. The ESA

“ENRD’s wildlife
smuggling program has
resulted in the successful
prosecution and
imprisonment of a number
of large and small-scale
smugglers, including the
leaders of some of the
world’s largest smuggling
operations.”
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also makes it unlawful to import or export wildlife at any port of
entry other than specifically designated ports, to fail to declare
wildlife upon importation or exportation, or to engage in importing or exporting without a license. 50 C.F.R. Part 14. Criminal
violations, which require only general intent, may result in
penalties up to one year of imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of
the species involved and equipment used to aid in the commission of the offense. 16 U.S.C. § 1540; 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
In addition to the ESA, U.S. enforcement officials can prosecute wildlife smugglers under the Lacey Act and under more
general Title 18 provisions. The Lacey Act, the oldest national
wildlife protection law in the United States, is a particularly
valuable tool to address transnational crime. It applies broadly
to all wild animals, alive or dead, and to any part, product, egg,
or offspring, as well as to protected plants indigenous to the
United States. 16 U.S.C. § 3371(a). The Lacey Act creates both

“The hoped for results of
all this exchange are the
development of trust,
knowledge, increased
enforcement capacity, and
a will to enforce.”
misdemeanor and felony offenses, which can result in up to five
years imprisonment, substantial fines, and forfeiture of equipment and wildlife involved in the offense. Additionally, violations of the Lacey Act can be predicated on breaches of foreign
laws or regulations. For example, a person who imports into the
United States wildlife which has been taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of a wildlife-related foreign law or
regulation (local, provincial, or national) can be prosecuted in
the United States under the Lacey Act based upon a violation of
that foreign country's laws.
It is this aspect of the Lacey Act. that makes it so valuable
and important, since it authorizes the United States to literally
reach illegal conduct that occurs in other countries, even if the
wildlife at issue is not listed on CITES and to impose penalties
even stronger than the ESA. Of course, such use of the Lacey
Act depends on the willingness and ability of foreign enforcement officials to provide evidence of their wildlife laws, testify in U.S. court, and otherwise cooperate with U.S. officials.
Finally, a number of more general Title 18 provisions can be
used to prosecute wildlife trafficking, such as the smuggling
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, a felony offense, which penalizes the
importation of any merchandise, including wildlife, contrary
to federal law.
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These laws give ENRD attorneys a broad array of tools to
address wildlife smuggling, but ENRD must first rely on the
investigative ground-work performed by several U.S. agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and
Border Protection Service ("CBP"), the Department of Interior's
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), the Department of
Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service ("NOAA
Fisheries"), the USCG, and the Department of Agriculture.
Their respective jurisdictions are normally determined by the
type of wildlife at issue or where the alleged violation occurred.
State wildlife officers also investigate violations of state wildlife
laws, which sometimes develop into federal cases. FWS port
inspectors and CBP inspectors typically detect trafficking
offenses. The FWS also employs about 230 special agents
around the country who investigate violations of federal wildlife
laws, issue citations for minor offenses, and prepare more serious cases for referral to ENRD.
ENRD, in conjunction with the agencies listed above and
the various U.S. Attorney's Offices, has developed a wildlife
smuggling enforcement program to combat the black market.
This program has several components. First, ENRD and its partners, most notably the U.S. FWS, identify and focus attention
and investigative resources on a specific type of illicit trade and,
where appropriate a specific region. Examples have included
birds from South America, reptiles from Southeast Asia, and
caviar from Eastern Europe and Asia. In some circumstances,
officials have focused particular attention on "king pins," who
control and profit from large international smuggling networks.
Second, interagency coordination and training are considered
essential, given the broad range of officials responsible for
investigating and prosecuting cases of wildlife smuggling.
ENRD attorneys regularly provide training to U.S. Attorneys
and federal, state, and foreign officials on wildlife enforcement
matters. Third, ENRD has developed a particular expertise in
prosecuting wildlife trafficking, employing attorneys who specialize in these cases and are well positioned to help guide
enforcement efforts nationwide or handle cases of particular significance. Finally, the international nature of wildlife trafficking
necessarily requires the cooperation of foreign officials, whether
to provide information or evidence of illegal activities, provide
testimony as to the violation of foreign laws, or surrender persons for extradition. ENRD regularly reaches out to foreign
enforcement officials through both formal and informal channels to develop contacts and secure enforcement cooperation in
specific cases. ENRD has participated in a number of foreign
training efforts through Interpol, UNEP, the CITES Secretariat,
and at the invitation of specific countries.
ENRD's wildlife smuggling program has resulted in the
successful prosecution and imprisonment of a number of large
and small-scale smugglers, including the leaders of some of the
world's largest smuggling operations. These efforts have also
led to confiscation of live animals and the imposition of significant fines. ENRD efforts to interdict caviar smuggling provide
a good example of how the program works in practice. Working
with FWS and CBP officials and U.S. Attorneys, ENRD identi24

fied caviar smuggling as a significant and lucrative illicit activity in a number of ports and businesses. ENRD gathered its partners at a "caviar summit" to share information on this specific
type of smuggling, identify the likely actors and regions, and
determine what further steps would be necessary to address the
problem. Such focused activity has paid dividends. For example, in early 2002, ENRD led a coordinated effort to prosecute
the owner of a food import company for conspiring to smuggle
protected sturgeon caviar, making false statements to federal
officials, and selling counterfeit caviar to retail food companies
with false labels. The defendant received a sentence of two
years in prison, incurred substantial criminal fines (both against
him and his company), and paid as restitution the customs duties
he had earlier avoided.

VESSEL POLLUTION INITIATIVE

Unlike the activities described above, which involve
instances of illegal trade, vessel pollution arises from the conduct of ship owners and operators and crew members who seek
to avoid the considerable costs and effort of treating waste oil
and other shipboard wastes by engaging in deliberate overboard
discharges without the use of required pollution prevention
equipment and then falsify required log books which are regularly inspected by USCG during port visits. However, vessel
pollution is still a transnational crime because it involves ships
of foreign flags that regularly transport cargo and goods to the
United States and around the world (in addition to domestic vessels transiting coastal waters and inland waterways. Moreover,
the pollution caused by illegal vessel discharges can affect the
resources of many nations. Finally, as with ODS and wildlife,
there is an international agreement that regulates the discharge
of vessels, the Convention and Protocol on the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships ("MARPOL"). Vessel pollution that violates MARPOL standards will necessarily violate the domestic
laws of countries such as the United States that implement
MARPOL.
MARPOL, also over 30 years old, is the primary international convention addressing vessel pollution. It is actually a
combination of two treaties and includes annexes regulating discharges of oil, noxious liquids, and harmful goods in packaged
form, sewage, garbage, and most recently air emissions (the latter annex and the annex on sewage not yet being in force). These
annexes establish international standards, authorize inspections
and require certain certifications and reporting. Annex 1 on oil
pollution, among other things, requires continuous monitoring
of oily water discharges, and requires countries to provide shore
reception and treatment facilities at oil terminals and ports. It
allows for ships to be inspected in the ports of other MARPOL
parties to ensure that such ships meet MARPOL requirements.
In the United States, MARPOL is principally implemented
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ("APPS"), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. APPS applies to all U.S. flag ships anywhere in the world and to all foreign flag vessels operating in
U.S. navigable waters or while at a port or terminal under U.S.
jurisdiction. Among other things, APPS requires the use of oilwater separators for certain vessels as well as the regular report25

ing of all overboard transfers of oily waste in logbooks that are
routinely inspected by USCG. In addition to APPS, a number of
other federal laws may regulate discharge of oil into water and
oil spills. These include the Federal Clean Water Act ("Clean
Water Act" or "CWA"), as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 ("OPA"), which prohibits discharges of oil into U.S.
waters and requires reporting of spills to designated authorities.
The CWA provides administrative and civil penalties for violations of its requirements, as well as criminal penalties for knowing or negligent discharge of oil and for failure to report a spill
to authorities. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1) & (2) and 1321(b)(3) &
(5). OPA also authorizes recovery of removal costs and civil
damages, including to natural resources, arising from oil spills
in U.S. waters or the exclusive economic zone. 33 U.S.C. §
2702. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(“Ocean Dumping Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1411, provides civil and
criminal penalties for unpermitted dumping of materials into the
ocean, including oil if that oil was brought on board to be
dumped. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1402(c), 1411, 1415. Finally, a number of
general crime provisions as well as maritime and natural
resource laws could be implicated by vessel discharges. These
include violations of: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for false statements provided in oil record books; 46 U.S.C. § 2302 and 18 U.S.C. § 2
for operating a ship in a grossly negligent manner; the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act for failure to notify USCG of hazardous
condition of a vessel; and other specific maritime laws.
Depending on where a spill occurred and what damage it might
have caused, the E.S.A. Act, National Marine Sanctuaries Act
and other wildlife laws might also be relevant.
Similar to wildlife and ODS smuggling investigations, vessel pollution investigations must be completed by law enforcement agencies before ENRD can begin its prosecution work.
USCG and EPA are the primary agencies responsible for
enforcement of APPS, CWA, OPA and related laws and refer
cases, mainly criminal prosecutions, to ENRD for judicial
enforcement. ENRD has developed a training program that has
been crucial to educating the necessary officials as to how to
build a case for successful U.S. prosecution.
ENRD's Vessel Pollution Initiative is a multi-pronged program aimed at deterring pollution from ships into the oceans,
U.S. coastal waters and inland waterways. The Initiative
includes pro-active operations, outreach to local prosecutors'
offices, policy coordination and training of agency investigators
and officials who are first responders to vessel spills. While
there have been criminal prosecutions for major environmental
damage resulting from catastrophic oil spills that have occurred
from time-to-time, the Vessel Pollution Initiative has focused
more on the detection and prosecution of deliberate violations of
environmental laws by vessel operators that occur on a regular
and routine basis. These have included successful prosecutions
of the world's large cruise ship operators, oil tankers, and tug
and barge operators on inland rivers. In the last five years, the
Initiative has resulted in over $80 million in criminal fines, over
eleven years of imprisonment (including corporate executives),
and agreements to institute fleet-wide pollution prevention proSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY 25

grams for most major cruise lines and several commercial fleets.
A number of recent prosecutions have uncovered systematic
practices aboard fleets of commercial ships to unlawfully discharge oily wastes at sea and to then falsify records and lie to
USCG inspectors in order to conceal the illegal practices. The
criminal prosecutions, which have highlighted this problem,
have also led USCG to intensify inspection procedures to better
detect and deter these types of violations.
As with the other initiatives, the Vessel Pollution Initiative
arose from a growing recognition of illegal conduct that was not
being addressed and a focus on specific regions where such conduct was believed to be occurring. It has required the pro-active
cooperation and coordination of a number of federal, state, and
local (and foreign) agencies and the regular exchange of information among them. ENRD has conducted numerous training
events with USCG and local officials, as well as with U.S.
Attorneys, in order to develop a broader expertise in detecting
and prosecuting these crimes. Finally, ENRD is increasingly
looking to share information and experiences with other nations.
In ENRD's experience, detection and prosecution of vessel pollution cases, even for spills and discharges occurring outside
U.S. territorial waters, are not difficult and can be based on the
use of standard, readily available technologies. ENRD believes
the success of its Initiative can easily be replicated by other countries with the political will and resources to address this problem.
To that end, ENRD has begun making presentations at relevant
international fora such as the International Maritime
Organization, and providing training to other maritime countries.
ENRD hopes that such efforts will lead to more cooperation and
enforcement in the United States as well as around the world.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS
AND COORDINATION

In each of the initiatives and programs described above, formal and informal international enforcement cooperation and
information exchange are critical. Smuggling of wildlife and
ODS necessarily involve the United States and its trading partners, for the goods must come into the United States from somewhere else, frequently through a third country. Therefore, ENRD
cannot prosecute such smuggling without some information and
cooperation from exporting or trans-shipping countries. As stated above, use of the Lacey Act, a particularly effective wildlife
smuggling statute, may be premised entirely on the laws of
another country, making formal legal assistance (e.g., securing
testimony and evidence through MLATs) absolutely essential.
Vessel pollution cases, too, frequently require coordination and
cooperation with foreign governments under which those vessels
are flagged or which have information about discharges. In all
these cases, defendants are frequently from other countries,
which might require extradition or cooperation in interdiction.
Given the international nature of these crimes and their
prosecution, it is essential that ENRD and its enforcement partners maintain close and continued contact. This is not often the
case because some countries allow only formalized contact
through established diplomatic channels or MLATs, some do not
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wish to cooperate or are limited by their laws, and some just do
not know whom to call. This is where international networks
and informal exchanges can be critical. Participation in international networks such as INECE, international meetings of
Interpol and other organizations, and training activities, U.S.
and foreign officials can meet and get to know each other, gauge
their respective capabilities, interests and authorities, discuss
common problems and intelligence, share best practices, and
seek ways to enhance enforcement efforts all over the world.
Enhanced global enforcement is a particularly important goal
for implementation of international environmental agreements
such as the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and MARPOL. Such
efforts must be continuous in order to reflect changing national
and international circumstances, the nature of the crimes, and
simply the constant change in personnel. Virtual networks can
be particularly critical by allowing real time updates and rapid
dissemination of information. Ultimately, the hoped for results
of all this exchange are the development of trust, knowledge,
increased enforcement capacity, and a will to enforce. In the
end, this type of contact benefits all parties involved and the
global environment.

CONCLUSION

Every country, whether industrialized or developing,
undoubtedly faces serious resource constraints that provide
impediments to effective and consistent prosecution of environmental crimes. Transnational crimes such as smuggling and vessel pollution, however, are too significant to ignore; they exact
tremendous costs in terms of lost financial, recreational and biological resources, increased global resource pollution, and the
undermining of domestic law and international agreements. The
United States is no different in having too few investigators and
prosecutors to interdict every smuggled item or defeat every discharge of oil. ENRD and its partner agencies have addressed
this shortage by developing a number of coordinated initiatives
and programs. These efforts maximize resources to address
transnational crime in as effective a way as possible to punish
violators, deter others from committing crimes, and mitigate
environmental harm wherever possible. Of course, the success
of these initiatives and programs depends on the existence in the
United States of strong authorities to implement the relevant
international treaties and, more importantly, the political will to
work together to prosecute and sentence those who violate the
law. Those factors are not necessarily found all over the world.
Nevertheless, the initiatives and programs discussed above can
be instructive to other countries facing the same transnational
crimes and resource issues, even if they cannot be (or should not
be) exactly replicated. At the same time, U.S. enforcement
authorities must necessarily depend on the cooperation of other
countries for assistance in prosecuting transnational violations.
ENRD stands ready to work with other countries to bring specific enforcement cases, share information, build domestic
enforcement capacity, and foster greater cooperation.
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AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE:
PRESERVING THE ENVIRONMENT AND STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMY

I

by Liz Klein*
INTRODUCTION

n September 2003, with little fanfare or attention, the Office
of Management and Budget (“OMB”) released Informing
Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs
and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on
State, Local, and Tribal Entities.1 The report is a direct response
to the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, which requires OMB to
report to Congress each year on the annual total costs and benefits of federal regulatory programs, the economic impacts of the
regulations, and OMB’s recommendations for reform.
According to the report, major federal rules promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) realized between
$1.2 and $4.8 billion in benefits and just under $200 million in
costs in fiscal year 2002.2 For the ten-year period from October
1, 1992 to September 30, 2002, the report estimates that the benefits from major EPA regulations were between $2.3 and $6.4
billion, while costs were kept below $2 billion.3 The report also
notes that “of the 107 rules reviewed by OMB over the last ten
years, four EPA rules…account for a substantial fraction of the
aggregate benefits reported.”4 Two rules limit particulate matter
and NOx emissions from heavy duty highway engines, one rule
limits emissions from light duty vehicles, and the other rule limits sulfur dioxide pursuant to acid rain provisions in the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act.5
These results may be surprising considering the environmental stance of the current
Administration, the rhetoric
against environmental regulations, and the constant animosity between stakeholders
involved in environmental policy debates. However, these
results lend support to a growing recognition that sound
environmental policies, even
those which include regulations, can in fact increase efficiency and lower costs while
also benefiting the quality of
air, land and water. Although
most U.S. industries still resist the notion of regulations, more
and more corporations are adopting higher environmental standards, realizing that such standards improve their performance
by eliminating waste, encouraging technological innovation and
providing stability for the future.
This article provides an introduction to some of the components necessary for a comprehensive environmental agenda for

the future. Such an agenda must include recognition and reward
of sustainable corporate practices, increased emphasis on the
value of stakeholder partnerships, and a strong government regulatory scheme supported by vigilant enforcement.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

The fight against further government regulation often
focuses on how the costs imposed on industry will affect job
security and the ability of businesses to remain economically
viable. Many members of Congress and the current
Administration are keenly aware of these concerns and are
quick to vilify any form of government regulation. In the press
release announcing OMB’s report, Dr. John Graham,
Administrator for the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs at OMB, stressed the Administration’s commitment to
simplifying and streamlining regulations to ensure that “wellintentioned compliance requirements do not have the unintended effect of killing jobs.”6 S. Fred Singer, President of the
Science & Environmental Policy Project, suggested in the early
1990s that the U.S. was “approaching a critical level where in
fact the economy is strangled, where enterprise is restrained,
where entrepreneurship is stifled.”7 Such assumptions about the
negative effects of government regulations belittle the very substantial long-term benefits of environmental regulations.
Throughout U.S. industry,
corporations of all sizes are
developing policies that are environmentally friendly, but also
good for business. The impetus
to create such policies is varied –
from a reactive response to critics or required regulations, to
participation in a government
incentive program, and in some
cases, to a recognition that profits and sustainable practices can
go hand in hand.
Dow Chemical, for instance,
made a significant investment in
its environmental management
policies after a steady decline in
stock value and increasing
8
threats to its business. The policies focus on recycling, eliminating waste, and reducing the use of scarce resources. Cargill
Dow, a joint venture of Dow Chemical Co. and Cargill Inc., now
produces plastic through a corn milling process, rather than

“… sound environmental
policies, even those which
include regulations, can in
fact increase efficiency
and lower costs while also
benefiting the quality of
air, land and water.”
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making the material using petroleum or oil. Spending over $900
million since the mid-1990s to improve its environmental practices, the chemical giant announced in 2001 that it had realized
$2.7 billion on its investment.
Citigroup, another major corporation, announced the adoption of a new, environmentally friendly corporate policy this
year that added “environmental impact” among the criteria used
to review financing projects.9 The move came after two years of
criticism and pressure from the Rainforest Action Network.
Included in the financial institution’s plan are investments in
clean energy activities such as solar panels and fuel cells,
reports on the amount of greenhouse gases emitted from projects it finances, and a ban on loans for commercial logging.
Even small companies, such as American Video Glass Co.,
are adopting environmentally friendly business practices.10 The
Pennsylvania television picture tube manufacturing company
recently signed on to the National Waste Minimization
Partnership with the EPA and agreed to voluntarily reduce their
generation of hazardous waste chemicals. The company reported that a one-time, $90,000 investment in a dust recycling system is saving an estimated $12,000 per year. These are just some
of the many examples of efforts being made across the country
by the corporate world.
In addition to being good for an individual company’s bottom line, the OMB report and many research studies suggest
that environmental policies are also good for economic growth
on a macro level. Daniel Esty and Michael Porter are two
researchers analyzing the effects that environmental improvements can have on a country’s economic progress. In their
report, Ranking National Environmental Regulation and
Performance: A Leading Indicator of Future Competitiveness?”
they found “no evidence that improving environmental quality
compromises economic progress.”11 Instead, their statistical
analysis suggests a strong correlation between sound environmental management and economic growth.

PRESSURE FROM ADVOCACY GROUPS
AND CONSUMERS

Understandably wary that corporate environmental
announcements are often no more than mere public relations
efforts, nonprofit organizations have generally been reluctant to
praise these projects. Many environmental groups are quick to
characterize such corporate policies as “greenwashing” intended to shield the public from other environmentally devastating
activities. The focus for many such groups has been attempting
to force change through public criticism and advocating an
increased role for government regulation and enforcement.
Investors and consumers have also become increasingly
aware of the importance of corporations using renewable
resources and adopting environmentally sound business practices. Many companies recognize the value that such practices
bring to their brand identity, their attractiveness to investors, and
their future stability in the marketplace. However, in their
report, World Resources 2002-2004: Decisions for the Earth:
Balance, Voice and Power, the World Resources Institute
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(“WRI”) noted that much greater emphasis should be placed on
providing businesses with the concrete data they need to “understand how good environmental practice can connect to good
financial performance.”12 The report noted that not enough corporations recognize the business value of adopting sustainable
programs, thus there should be a greater focus on quantifying
the benefits of sound environmental practices and making this
information widely available to all stakeholders.

PROMOTING PARTNERSHIPS

In addition to advocating greater access to information,
WRI has joined other organizations in calling for increased collaboration and partnerships between traditional adversaries.
Such partnerships foster open communication and allow
increased understanding about the concerns of all stakeholders.
Two leaders in the movement toward cooperative partnerships
are Environmental Defense (“ED”) (formerly the
Environmental Defense Fund) and Pew Charitable Trusts.
In the late 1980s, ED created a pioneering partnership with
the McDonalds Corporation, which led McDonalds to eliminate
tons of packaging waste and implement a new recycling program.13 On the tenth anniversary of the alliance, ED President
Fred Krupp noted how creating these relationships and “combining diverse talents and perspectives in a spirit of cooperation
can yield sustained environmental results.”14 Following this

“Statistical analysis
suggests a strong
correlation between sound
environmental
management and
economic growth.”
success, ED joined forces with Pew Charitable Trusts to create
the Alliance for Environmental Innovation (“Alliance”).
Accepting no funding from its corporate partners, the
Alliance works with private companies to create and implement
environmentally friendly practices that are also friendly to the
business’ bottom lines. Current partners include United Parcel
Service (“UPS”), SC Johnson, Bristol-Myers Squibb and
Starbucks. The focus of these partnerships has been on reducing
waste, decreasing emissions, and minimizing the environmental
impact of formulated products. In addition to working with individual companies, the Alliance has encouraged other organizations to form similar partnerships. The Alliance provides a
model partnership agreement on their website15 and has published “Catalyzing Environmental Results: Lessons in Advocacy
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Organization-Business Partnerships,” a report of the Alliance’s
successes and failures over the years.16
Pew’s Center on Global Climate Change has also established the Business Environmental Leadership Council, which
is composed of a wide variety of companies that acknowledge
the threat of climate change and work closely with Pew to find
solutions.17 Member companies pledge to address the threat of
climate change through measures such as reducing greenhouse
gas emissions and implementing waste reduction programs.
Pew receives no monetary contributions from any members of
the Council. In creating the Council, Eileen Claussen, founder
and now President of the Pew Center for Global Climate
Change, recognized that “solutions that do not make economic
sense will eventually follow the declining path of the oceans,

“By working as partners
rather than adversaries,
advocacy organizations
achieve a greater
understanding of the
economic pressures
businesses face, while
businesses learn the
importance of sustainable
practices.”
ecosystems, species and natural resources the Pew Center is trying to protect.”18 By working as partners rather than adversaries, advocacy organizations achieve a greater understanding
of the economic pressures businesses face, while businesses
learn the importance of sustainable practices.

IMPORTANCE OF ENFORCEMENT

Improved information about the benefits of environmentally friendly business policies, increased adoption of such policies
by corporations, and better collaboration between nonprofit
organizations and the corporate world mean little without a
strong government regulatory scheme supported by vigilant
enforcement. In its Decisions for the Earth report, WRI stresses
the continuing need for government regulation in environmental
disclosure policies. The report notes that the government is the
only institution able to ensure adherence to environmental
goals, and it is uniquely positioned to provide important data to
businesses on the economic value of environmental programs.19
As the OMB report shows, government regulation in the
29

last ten years has led to significant benefits for the environment,
while keeping costs manageable. Former EPA Director William
Reilly noted that through Clean Air Act regulations, the EPA
“has been directly responsible for fostering new technologies
and promoting the genuine integration of the nation’s environmental aspirations with its economic goals.”20 Unfortunately,
when such regulations are vilified, they are less likely to be
enforced, and further regulation is jeopardized.
The Bush administration has faced significant criticism for
its apparent unwillingness to enforce environmental regulations,
particularly through the issue of sanctions or fines. A recent
Philadelphia Inquirer article reported that violation notices
against polluters have dropped significantly in the current
administration.21 While the first Bush administration averaged
195 citations a month and the Clinton administration averaged
183, the current administration average is just 77, and the average is falling with each year of Bush’s presidency. Additionally,
many are charging that the current administration is not committed to strong enforcement policies, as evidenced by the resignations of several top enforcement officials at the EPA, and by
the White House’s annual call for budget cuts for EPA enforcement. While administration officials contend that they use alternative methods to ensure compliance with regulations, many
experts insist that violation citations are one of the most effective tools of enforcement. As former EPA Enforcement Chief
Sylvia Lowrance pointed out, “[Violation citations] measure
presence. They measure whether the enforcement cop is on the
beat. And increasingly the cop is absent.”22

CONCLUSION

A comprehensive environmental agenda for the future will
be one that recognizes the compatibility of sustainable development and economic growth. We need to change the tone of the
environmental debate and find increased opportunities for interaction and cooperation among nonprofits, industry, and the government. We also need to focus on the importance of quantifying the benefits of environmentally friendly practices in order to
educate the corporate world about how such practices raise their
bottom line, spur technological innovation, and promote stability into the future.
As the OMB report illustrates, while so many regulations
are dismantled due to concerns about costs, the effects of some
of the most contentious regulations, such as those promulgated
under the Clean Air Act, clearly have benefits that far outweigh
the costs. A strong regulatory scheme does not lead to economic disaster; instead, the government has a responsibility to assess
the very real threats against the environment and establish the
goals and guidelines that we must follow to address those
threats. These goals must be backed by vigilant enforcement in
order to be meaningful and in order for the full benefits of regulations to be realized. Not only can such a regulatory scheme
lead to the preservation of our nation’s environment, it can also
lead to the preservation of our nation’s economy.
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THE ACCESS INITIATIVE:

PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE
by Melissa Dasgupta*
“Outside a closed battery recycling plant on Otay Mesa
in Tijuana, Mexico, open pits of toxic waste…”1 define the
once pristine landscape, and “chemicals leaching up”2 from
the soil form an ominous and unnatural crust on the earth.
“In the barrio of Chilpancingo, below the mesa, 19 children
were born with no brains in 1993 and 1994, because of pollution from…[industrial facilities] on top of the mesa.”3

T

INTRODUCTION

o prevent such horrific tragedies as the one that
occurred in the barrio of Chilpancingo, environmental
organizations across the world promote Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and treaties, support educational
campaigns, and participate in corporate lobbying and protests.
The Access Initiative (“TAI”), however, focuses on “good
governance” and the establishment of worldwide environmental standards as critical elements in avoiding these
tragedies, and ultimately promoting sustainable development.
TAI is a coalition of international groups “working together to
promote national-level implementation of commitments to
public access to information, participation, and justice in
decisions that affect the environment.”4 TAI supports the
premise that “good governance” values such as transparency,
access to information, voting rights, and public accountability have a direct effect on a country’s level of environmental
compliance.5
TAI is modeled after Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration.6 The organization asserts that access to information, an open decision-making process, and a system of justice
are essential components of a comprehensive system of environmental enforcement. TAI’s ultimate goal is to keep governments of participating countries accountable to the public for
their actions. Accountability will then extend to other nations,
creating an international awareness of the importance of making, implementing, and enforcing environmental laws.7
In accordance with these goals, TAI builds civil-society
coalitions, sets reform priorities, raises public awareness, and
assesses government progress. From 2001-2002, TAI launched
a worldwide campaign to assess various countries’ levels of
public participation and progress towards sustainable development.8 The methodology included review of planning documents, legislation, and court cases; interviews with government
officials and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”); questionnaires, requests for information and media analysis. These
criteria were compiled and assessed to determine how well public authorities provide (1) access to environmental information;
(2) access to decision-making affecting the environment; and
(3) access to justice and remedies.9
31

By creating a more standardized method of assessing environmental governance, TAI hopes to identify the full range of
access to environmental information, participation, and enforcement in countries across the world. These studies are steps
towards creating a worldwide standard for measuring and promoting sustainable development. A finding that TAI’s assessment criteria are accurate and reliable10 could help governments
identify and remedy environmental problem areas, as well as
better notify the population of these potential situations. While
such methods are commonly used to assess education, health,
and the economy, this proposed environmental application is
innovative and challenging, especially given the complications
inherent in establishing standard environmental indicators.11
Previous efforts at creating standardized environmental criteria
include the Environmental Sustainability Index,12 State of the
Environment Reports,13 the Human Development Report,14 the
World Bank governance indicators,15 and the Wellbeing of
Nations survey.16
TAI’s pilot assessment evaluated nine countries and relied
on more than 100 indicators, 79 of which were applied by all or
most of the national teams. An international team17 created these
indicators, formed the methodology, and identified sources that
might provide comprehensive data.18 Teams then began individual assessments of their pilot countries: Chile, India, Mexico,
Thailand, the United States, Hungary, Indonesia, South Africa,
and Uganda. Most of these assessments were completed in just a
few months and were fairly affordable. Some assessments even
resulted in constructive dialogues with national governments
regarding ways to improve performance, as well as access to
information.19 The most significant result, however, seemed to
be TAI’s comprehensive dissection of where each nation’s problem spots exist and how these issues might be addressed.
TAI found that many countries, including the United States,
had strong legal provisions establishing open access to environmental information, but demonstrated weak implementation of
these laws. Since “government bureaucrats and agencies have
wide discretion to decide what information is secret, what to
share, how to share it and with whom,”20 it is often difficult for
citizens to obtain information about their country’s environmental performance. This lack of access to information was especially true in Mexico, Hungary, and Thailand. TAI found that the
excessive ambiguity in these countries’ legislation and the limited access to definitions and statutory interpretation created a situation where the average citizen would have tremendous difficulty comprehending the system of environmental reporting.21
*Melissa Dasgupta is a JD, expected graduation in 2005, American University,
Washington College of Law
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TAI TEST PILOT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

In its pilot assessment, TAI attempted to determine how
sustainable development and environmental compliance are
being treated around the world. TAI did this by analyzing nine
countries’ opportunities for the public to access environmental
information, participation, and legal review.

PUBLIC ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

In evaluating the nine pilot countries,22 TAI assessed how
these countries differed in their ability to disseminate information effectively and quickly. Specifically, TAI compared
South Africa’s response to a cholera outbreak in 2000 with
India’s response to a liquid gas petroleum storage tank accident in 2001, and analyzed how and why these responses differed in effectiveness.
To determine whether a country provided effective access
to environmental information, TAI assessed the responsiveness
of authorities to requests for information, the extent of active
information dissemination, whether information was provided

public even though TAI found that they all collected data on
industrial compliance with air and water laws.27 Countries provided varying explanations as to why they either released the
collected data or kept their findings secret. Mexico, South
Africa and Uganda consider this information a matter of complete corporate privacy and do not release it to the public.
Indonesia, while failing to disclose specific information to the
public, still rates industrial facilities on their environmental
compliance. Conversely, the United States is on the forefront of
emissions reporting and it requires industrial facilities to submit
Toxic Release Inventories.28 Hungary and Mexico are working
toward a similar system of documenting industrial pollution.29
Another source of environmental information is the use of environmental impact statements throughout the world.30
Dissemination of information is especially important when
environmental disasters occur. A government’s ability to disseminate information quickly and react appropriately will have a
huge effect on public safety and security. TAI’s studies showed
that governments react quicker to large-scale
disasters where there is a high media presence, versus smaller, isolated incidents
receiving little media exposure. Researchers
found, however, that once the crisis passed,
governments are ineffective at providing
information about the long-term consequences and impacts of these emergencies.31

“The Access Initiative supports the
premise that “good governance”
values such as transparency, access
to information, voting rights, and
public accountability have a direct
effect on a country’s level of
environmental compliance.”
in a range of formats, and the timeliness and coverage of information provided both during and after emergencies. These criteria were also analyzed regarding clarity of content, frequency
of reporting, and breadth and coordination of coverage.23
Most countries were proficient at disseminating information regarding air pollution, but only the United States and
South Africa were also successful at disseminating information
about drinking water.24 Other countries such as Hungary and
Indonesia proved unsuccessful due to inefficient government
procedures and inconsistent data collection. The problem of
inconsistent data collection makes standardizing reports, such as
the State of the Environment Reports mandated by the Aarhus
Convention,25 difficult to rely on. Even so, the mere fact that
these reports exist exhibits a government’s attempt at disseminating information to its citizens. Of countries participating in
the pilot assessment, only the United States and Indonesia do
not consistently produce these reports.26
TAI discovered that the most difficult information to access
was that concerning pollution at industrial facilities. Most countries surveyed did not make this information available to the
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CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA AND
INDIA’S ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION

In order to assess government information dissemination during emergency situations, TAI compared the South African government’s response to a cholera outbreak in
2000 with the Indian government’s handling
of a liquid gas petroleum storage tank
explosion in 2001. TAI distinguished South Africa’s quick and
effective response from India’s lack of efficiency and inability
to follow its own environmental laws. As a result, TAI gave
South Africa a higher score in the assessment.
TAI rated the South African government’s response to a
cholera outbreak during the summer of 2000 as “strong.”32
When the price for tap water rose to excessive heights, many
South African citizens were unable to afford their water bills
and began drinking river water, which was plagued by a poor
waste management system and regional flooding. These factors combined to create 58,000 cases of cholera and 122
deaths.33 The government immediately and effectively
responded to the situation by employing its own machinery, as
well as seeking help from international sources. By the end of
the crisis, the World Health Organization complimented the
South African government for keeping death rates below 0.5%
of reported cases – the lowest death rate ever reported in South
Africa during a cholera outbreak.34
Because cholera is a disease that demands immediate
response, this crisis was an opportune moment to observe the
32

South African government’s ability to respond to an emergency
situation. “By responding immediately, we increase our chances
of containing cholera. Through prevention and education, we also
can reduce the risk of the disease spreading,” said Habiba Bihi of
the American Red Cross.35 South Africa specifically addressed
the situation by convening emergency meetings among government officials, and allocating $82.5 million for water and sanitation projects in Kwazulu-Natal province. Other decisions included opening rehydration centers to prevent more deaths, sending
South African National Defense Forces to rural areas with freshwater tankers, and treating, as well as quarantining, those infected with cholera. The government then took preventative steps
such as training volunteers to teach affected villagers about
cholera prevention, detection, water safety, and hygiene.36
TAI compared South Africa’s response to that of the Indian
government when a liquid gas petroleum storage tank exploded
in 2001 at Flex Industries in Gwalior, India.37 Even though
India had laws in place requiring the government to notify the
population of threats such as this one, the
government took no action after the explosion. Although this case involved a smaller
risk to fewer people than what was encountered in South Africa, TAI rated India’s
response as “poor” because of the government’s inability to react to an emergency or
even to follow its own laws.38 Interestingly,
there was a discrepancy in news coverage
between the two disasters – South Africa
received extensive media attention whereas
India’s exposure was limited.
Although the best situation would
have been for the two governments to have
taken steps to prevent the disasters before
they even occurred, TAI determined that
South Africa’s quick and effective response was still commendable, and was one step closer to sustainable development.

cussions, did not require public consent for economic and developmental natural resources decisions, or lacked adequate provisions for participation at different stages of the decision-making
cycle. While many of these governments articulated that they
approved of the idea of the public participating in the creation of
government documents, such an articulation alone does not hold
the binding authority of a constitutionally enumerated right.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

TAI also assessed whether countries’ laws allowed the public to use administrative or judicial review to voice their concerns vis-à-vis how environmental policies were being developed or implemented. In assessing the ability of legal review,
TAI looked at legal standing, affordability of legal help and fees,
and the presence and diversity of mechanisms for dispute resolution and remedy. Countries receiving quality assessments had
legal review systems that were inclusive and clear as to the legal
mandates to disclose information and as to the legal definitions
of environmental information in the public domain.41

“TAI found that many countries,
including the United States, had
strong legal provisions establishing
open access to environmental
information, but demonstrated weak
implementation of these laws.”

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

TAI assessed how the pilot countries allowed for public
participation, and for the public to learn about the government’s
environmental decisions. Assessment criteria for public participation in environmental decision-making included reviewing
the existence of opportunities for citizens to participate and the
ability of the public to learn not only about these opportunities,
but about the outcome of environmental deliberations. TAI also
assessed the inclusiveness of consultation and whether notification of the ability to participate was timely.39
Legally and constitutionally, almost all of the countries surveyed did not explicitly provide for public participation rights in
their legal frameworks. Thailand is the only country that specifically allotted a constitutional right for citizens to participate.
Mexico established broad constitutional guarantees for public
participation; however, the procedures are so tedious and
exhausting that the objective of participation is often lost in the
process.40 Most other countries surveyed either excluded certain
groups of people from participating in these environmental dis33

Once information is available, and there is a legal mechanism by which the public can participate, countries must also
create an adequate enforcement structure in order to protect
such rights. TAI researchers found this to be the weakest element across the board of the three access principles. Most countries created laws to allow public participation, yet had no binding system of review. In fact, the rights and laws created are
often so ambiguous that they are not legally enforceable. Even
laws that are clear tend to be riddled with exhaustive standing
requirements and other administrative obstacles, making them
void of any practical application. Researchers found that “in less
than half the case . . . assessed was the public able to use administrative or judicial review to contest how national or regional
environmental policies were made.”42 In fact, courts and administrative agencies often had complete authority and discretion
over huge decisions regarding logging, mining, grazing, and
other huge resource concessions. This lack of public participation is frequently an indication of corruption and tends to trivialize the concept of judicial review. Certainly, it is nearly impossible to enforce environmental laws when even the courts cannot be trusted.
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Some countries are helpless in enforcing public participation laws due to gross inefficiencies, exhaustive administrative
obstacles, and the high prices of adhering to these ineffective
procedures. These inefficiencies can inadvertently serve as complete barriers to judicial review. For example, fees to register an
environmental case can cost more than 50% of the average
annual income of a Chilean citizen and more than 20% of the
average annual income of a Hungarian citizen.43 While South
Africa has an established government-sponsored program which
provides free legal assistance to the poor, most other countries
have no such outlets for lower income citizens. However,
Thailand and the United States have large networks of pro-bono
lawyers, which is a significant step towards access to review.44

TAI’S FINDINGS AND HOW THIS INFORMATION CAN
BE APPLIED

TAI’s findings show that without adequate data gathering,
public access to information, or public participation in decisionmaking, few people will have the luxury of judicial review. One
major step toward improving this information dissemination and
providing adequate judicial review for all citizens, regardless of
income or country, is to create international standards by which
environmental concerns can be measured and benchmarked.
Both the United Nations Environment Programme45 and the
Aarhus Convention46 stress the need to maintain a central environmental information service and commit to a practice of early
consultation with stakeholders on environmental decisions.
However, this alone may not be enough. To avoid the inefficiencies of bureaucracy which seem to slow the process of
obtaining quick and effective results, governments will need to
improve their capacity by continuously training staff and civil
servants regarding new legislation and how to implement it. TAI
found that only two countries were effective in training staff on
new rules regarding the dissemination of environmental and
public participation.47
Though ambitious, these steps are necessary to create standardized environmental enforcement across the world.
However, the high cost of such compliance makes it exceedingly difficult for poorer countries, such as Chile and Uganda,
whose environmental information systems are completely supported by donor assistance, to adequately comply with these
expensive necessities.48 Due to the rising cost of such implementation, the business world’s participation and support would
greatly contribute to the realization of TAI goals. In addition to
industries themselves, organizations that provide financing for
industrial projects can also influence public participation in the
decision-making process.
TAI noted that other successful methods of promoting good
governance and environmental compliance have been protests,
media coverage, NGO participation in high profile litigation,
and negotiation with government officials regarding allocation
of funding and education. In fact, governments in South Africa,
Chile, Hungary, India, Mexico, and Thailand all support environmental education.49 Yet, oftentimes this education comes not
from the government, but from the dedication of NGOs.
Furthermore, countries differ greatly in their openness to NGO
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participation. While South Africa is extremely open to NGO
input and contributions, other countries, such as Chile, Hungary,
Indonesia, Uganda, and India, have excessive registration
requirements or restrictions on foreign funding for NGOs.50
This often results in stifling the very impetus of public access to
information, participation, and review.
After viewing the many results and insights of TAI’s assessment, we are reminded of the balancing act present in every
government throughout the world. Governments are forced to
press forward with important and crucial interests such as environmental safety, while battling inefficiency, corruption and a
lack of funding. Often times the very administrative systems set
up to remedy the problems tend to stand in the way of progress
by creating exhaustive procedures and impossible goals. This is
why programs and research such as TAI prove invaluable.

“Most countries created
laws to allow public
participation, yet had no
binding system of review.
In fact, the rights and
laws created are often so
ambiguous that they are
not legally enforceable.”
Without NGOs and other such organizations to take on this
work, there would be less reporting of necessary information,
making the crucial step of solving these identified problems
exceedingly difficult.

APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES

While TAI’s assessment and suggestions are instructive, the
United States government provides a progressive model to
understand the interplay of various forces and the balancing act
that results. Although public participation in governance seems
to be the answer to many societal problems, specifically those
dealing with the environment, it also creates an inevitable conflict between efficiency and fairness. Despite the fact that various types of governments and systems manifest this conflict differently, the United States illustrates some of the nuanced challenges that still exist, even in the face of both democracy and
environmental regulation.
While President Bush expressed his opinion that “the
American people are using their money far better than the government would have,”51 many believe that a strong regulatory
system is the only way to balance both fairness and efficiency.
34

This is why the United States has established such a broad
administrative system with such strong regulatory authority.
While many people dislike big government, most still want the
freedom of safe streets, welfare, clean water and clean air. This
tension between a laissez-faire economy and a system that protects public health and the environment continues to be grappled
with in the United States and throughout the world.
The American regulatory system addresses this tradeoff in
various contexts and venues, such as in Congress and the various
executive agencies. While Congress creates the legal foundation
for most agency policy through legislation, executive agencies
promulgate the rules that often fill the gaps. These agencies interpret laws, promulgate regulations, and form a powerful element
of the federal government.52 Because the President appoints the
heads of most agencies, agencies’ policies often change with new
Administrations. This is significant because agencies have a fair
amount of discretion in making rules.

discretion. Pursuant to national security and the need to prevent
terrorist attacks like that of September 11, 2001, U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft issued a memo56 in October of 2001. The
memo instructed agencies to use a higher standard of secrecy in
regard to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).57 TAI
noted the large effect this would have on the American population, as nearly 2 million FOIA requests were filed with federal
agencies during the fiscal year 1999.58
While this new standard of secrecy impacts access to information uniformly, it also affects many environmental laws such
as the Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act
(“EPCRA”).59 Title III of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act created EPCRA with the idea of encouraging emergency planning for chemical accidents. EPCRA’s four
components are Community Right-to-Know reporting,
Emergency Planning and Notification, Emergency Release
Notification, and Toxic Chemical Release Inventory report-

“Without broad-based public access to information, the
transparency with which the United States government
prides itself could be slowly eroding.”
One of the central cases defining agency discretion is
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.53 In Chevron, the court exercised judicial restraint by giving “deference” to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. The court set out a two-part test in making this decision.
The first is whether the statute is ambiguous. If the statute is not
ambiguous, courts will nullify any interpretation that is contrary
to the plain meaning of the statute. If the statute is ambiguous,
the court will apply the second test, which is whether the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.54 In practice, this means
that so long as agencies can show a rational basis for an interpretation, a court will likely hold that the given interpretation is
reasonable and thus within the agency’s discretion. The Chevron
standard is far from difficult to show and provides a considerable amount of leeway for various different readings of a particular statute. This ability to make changes in rules and interpretations with minimal supervision by the judiciary allows
agency actions to change with the appointment of a new agency
head or the election of a new President. Thus, aside from the
Presidential election process and the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act,55 the American
people are generally unable to affect the majority of agency
decisions. While broad power is often necessary for the functioning of an agency, Americans are faced with an inability to
affect changes in regulations and policies that often have farreaching ramifications in their lives.
One of the current concerns outlined in TAI’s analysis of
the United States involves the effects of giving agencies such
35

ing.60 This scheme of providing local governments and the public with information on chemical hazards in their communities
constitutes an important element in TAI’s framework.
TAI noted that in October 2001, the Environmental
Protection Agency removed information from its website
regarding Risk Management Plans in the event of a chemical
spill. While this information merely informed workers and communities about potential consequences and ways to avoid chemical spills,61 it was considered a security risk, precluding public
access. Though the interest of national security is obviously
paramount, many Americans are concerned that the power of the
people may be getting lost in administration and security. TAI
expressed concern about the ability of the United States government to restrict the dissemination of information in the interest
of national security. TAI then recommended advocating for a
constitutional amendment that would solidly protect the public’s
right to information.62 While few of the pilot countries have
constitutional protections regarding access to information, TAI
considers a constitutional guarantee to be “the most immutable
means of ensuring public access to information.”63
Without such access, the transparency with which the
United States government prides itself could be slowly eroding.
While most Americans are not aware of how powerful or how
discretionary agencies can be, this is where many of the
American transparency battles are fought. On one side is the
argument for an efficient and secure administration and on the
other is the argument for fairness, participation, and access to
information. At the end of the day, America’s system of goverSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

nance is not the embodiment of efficiency and is not always fair,
but actually a bureaucracy that balances these goals, all the
while making slow progress. As transparency is reduced, efficiency, security, and progress will increase, but fairness and
public participation will be compromised, having an adverse
effect on sustainable development and other national goals.
While the extent of this compromise and the long-term ramifications in America are yet to be seen, countries across the world
and throughout history have faced the same tradeoff. Winston
Churchill addressed this dilemma through his statement
“democracy is the worst form of government except for all
those others that have been tried.”
However, aside from the reduction in U.S. transparency
since 2001, the high discretion of agencies and the time consuming processes, the American people still have more freedoms than most other citizens of the world. With continued
TAI-type assessments and evaluations of the actual levels of
transparency and the effects on environmental compliance,
Americans can take steps toward sustainable development. The
United States illustrates how a country must first have the
machine of governance working in order to allow objectives
such as environmental compliance to thrive. Yet, the degree of
transparency and the degree to which people participate in the
government within the United States now and in the future will
likely have a substantial impact on United States’ progress
toward sustainable development.

CONCLUSION

Because of work conducted by organizations such as TAI,
the world community is better equipped to build a framework
where environmental variables are assessed on a common scale.
Additionally, the reports and recommendations produced by
TAI are invaluable to each country assessed because they provide constructive criticism concerning how to score well in sustainable development. The analysis focuses on good governance
as one of the essential foundations of environmental compliance
and creates a progressive formula for success. Yet obstacles are
abound and application will always be more challenging than
recommendation. As evidenced in the above analysis of the
United States, even a country that prides itself in both democracy as well as having started the environmental movement has
many challenges ahead.
While TAI provides an amazing service to the world population by generating this data, more studies will likely be necessary before one consistent measuring standard is adopted worldwide. Some possible extensions of TAI could include studying
more countries, making the studies broader and more exhaustive, and taking the next step of advocating recommendations in
various countries. If the world can establish a common standard
of environmental compliance assessment, it will be that much
closer toward creating an enforceable international legal framework for sustainable development.
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CITES IN AFRICA:

AN EXAMINATION OF DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

T

by Yvonne Fiadjoe*
INTRODUCTION

he Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (“CITES”) has been relatively ineffective in
Africa as a result of minimal enforcement and compli1
ance. As a non-self-enforcing treaty, CITES requires that State
Parties enact domestic legislation to enforce the provisions of
the Convention. Even though non-compliance with CITES is
not unique to the African region,2 there are several factors peculiar to the region that exacerbate the problem of implementation
of these provisions. These problems must be addressed simultaneously from geographic, social, political, and economic angles.
Because of the importance of species preservation and the
prominence of international environmental law in modern legal
systems, African countries ought to include CITES provisions in
their domestic laws. To ensure the effectiveness of the
Convention, African countries must domestically enforce all
CITES provisions.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part One provides a
brief overview of CITES and background to the African situation. Part Two details some of the problems which have impeded the implementation of CITES in Africa. Part Three then discusses recommendations and proposals to ensure compliance
with CITES in signatory countries of the African region. Part
Four provides a conclusion to this study.

PART ONE: OVERVIEW OF CITES & BACKGROUND
TO THE AFRICAN SITUATION

CITES is an international conservation agreement providing guidelines for trade3 in endangered species.4 CITES
entered into effect in July 19755 and currently has 152 signatories.6 The Convention7 has been regarded as the Magna Carta8
for wildlife.9
CITES10 was created11 in order to protect12 endangered
species from extinction.13 To achieve this aim, CITES categorizes species into three appendices14 indicating the actual numbers of a species and how trade affects the species.15Different
levels of protection are accorded to each Appendix.16 Appendix
1 species are those “threatened with extinction which are or may
be affected by trade.”17 As a result, trade in Appendix 1 species
is only authorized in exceptional circumstances. Appendix 2
species are those that are not immediately threatened with
extinction, but may become so unless trade is restricted.18
Therefore, trade in species listed in Appendix 2 is subject to
restrictions in order to prevent utilization that is “incompatible
with their survival.”19 Species protected under Appendix 3 are
species that require regulation.20 These species are not immediately threatened with extinction, but still require regulation in
order to prevent exploitation.21 Trade in species categorized
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under the three appendices is restricted unless it is in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention.22
Because CITES is a non-self-executing treaty, a State party
must usually adopt legislative or other measures to implement
the Convention.23 Since 1992,24 the laws of 136 countries have
been reviewed under the National Legislation Project (“NLP”),
a system for reviewing and evaluating domestic measures to
implement CITES.25 In determining the level of compliance, the
NLP looks at four criteria:26 (1) whether there has been legislative designation of authorities responsible for implementing the
Convention;27 (2) whether legislation addresses all species listed in the Convention;28 (3) whether domestic legislation
expressly prohibits illegal trade and designates specific depart-

“In reality,
implementation without
subsequent enforcement
has the same effect as no
implementation at all.”
ments and agents responsible for enforcing the Convention;29
and (4) whether domestic legislation facilitates30 the confiscation or return of species that are illegally traded.31
After this assessment is made, countries are classified into
one of three categories. Countries accorded Category 1 status
are those that have adequately implemented all necessary legislation to ensure compliance with CITES. Category 2 countries
are those that have implemented some legislation, but need
more to meet the legislative requirements.32 Category 3 countries are those that have not met the requirements of CITES.
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Despite the various categorizations, the effectiveness of
CITES does not depend on whether countries have enacted the
necessary legislation, but on whether the legislation is being
enforced. Nevertheless, attaining Category 1 status is an important first step in the quest for compliance and effectiveness.33
The African Situation
The success of CITES is often determined by the number of
animals listed in the appendices, the number of member countries in a region, the number of proposals submitted, and the
number of permits issued.34 If these were the only determinants
of compliance with CITES in Africa, then implementation of
CITES could be considered a resounding success. In fact, 49 out
of 52 African countries are State Parties to CITES, comprising
32% of the Convention’s signatories.
However, the seminal indicator of whether the treaty is
effective is not accession or ratification alone, but rather the
implementation and enforcement of the treaty provisions within
a country.35 The dual process of implementation and enforce-

“Recognizing the inherent
weaknesses of CITES,
African States have
resorted to several other
initiatives designed
primarily to strengthen
compliance with CITES.”
ment must not be decoupled. To do so would render the treaty
ineffective. In reality, implementation without subsequent
enforcement has the same effect as no implementation at all. The
key to enforcement is in actual ‘on-the-ground’ compliance.
Therefore, the success of CITES should not be determined by the
number of State parties to the Convention, but by the actual compliance with its provisions. In this respect, many African countries have failed to fully implement the CITES provisions into
domestic legislation and enforce those provisions enacted.36
Of the 49 African countries that are signatories to CITES,
only five countries are classified as Category 1 countries.37
Because African countries have the largest species populations
in the world (for example, 40% of the 4,800 plant species located in the deserts of South Africa can be found nowhere else in
the world), it is of critical importance to take note of these trends
and to discern ways in which the problem may be addressed.
Twenty countries, or 41%, have been accorded Category 2
status countries.38 Even though limited implementation by these
countries is better than no implementation at all, the effective39

ness of the Convention is greatly undermined by such minimal
compliance. For the Convention to be effective, there must be
full implementation of the necessary legislation coupled with
compliance.
The majority of African countries fall under the Category 3
rubric. These twenty-four countries, or 45%, need to strengthen
their initiatives to ensure full compliance with the Convention.
Considering that the vast majority of the countries in this category ratified the Convention more than fifteen years ago,39 it
seems that there are fundamental problems that may need to be
addressed. In fact, this trend may be indicative of the existence
of collective problems that are impeding the implementation of
the CITES in Africa.

FAILED INITIATIVES

Recognizing the inherent weaknesses of CITES, African
States have resorted to several other initiatives designed primarily to strengthen compliance with CITES.
The Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (“MIKE”)
system is one such initiative.40 The basic premise of the MIKE
system is to monitor illegal elephant hunting and determine the
impact of such hunting on elephant species. This system entails
data collection at designated sites in selected African and Asian
States, including a collection of elephant population data,41
reporting of illegal hunting, and deployment of law enforcement
officers to detect illegal hunting and trade.42
One of the major shortcomings of the MIKE system,
though, is that it does not provide a mechanism to ensure actual
compliance with CITES. It only provides data on elephant
species. Furthermore, the complexity of the system requires
huge amounts of funding for it to be successful. Recognizing
that the elephant is only one of several species listed in CITES
appendices, it is very difficult to justify expending such large
amounts of funds on one species.43
The 1994 Lusaka Agreement is another initiative that has
impacted CITES.44 This Agreement entered into force in 1996,
and provided for the development of wildlife law enforcement
officers recruited from National Bureaus.45 These officers were
a part of the Lusaka Agreement Task Force (“LATF”), which was
primarily responsible for conducting cross-border investigations
into wildlife trade at the requests of the National Bureaus. The
LATF’s mandate was very wide, permitting them to take part in
undercover operations and move freely between States without
visas and entry restrictions, subject to the consent of Parties.
The Lusaka Agreement signaled a positive step by African
nations to curtail illegal trade, but it was not successful.
Although it was open to accession by all African States, only six
have acceded.46 Issues of sovereignty were of great concern to
State Parties. Furthermore, as with most agreements in Africa,
the Lusaka Agreement had severe funding problems. To date, all
these factors have severely crippled the effectiveness of the
Lusaka Agreement.
Subsequently, the South African Development
Community47 developed a protocol on wildlife conservation
and law enforcement. This protocol basically prescribes an
alternative for wildlife law enforcement.48 The Protocol does
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away with the issue of cross-border policing, replacing that system with Interpol.
A problem with African countries’ implementation of
CITES is that they have developed several systems geared
towards the same aim. In so doing, they spread their finances
and human resources too thin and become jacks-of-all-trades
but masters at none. African States ought to focus on the development of one regime and place all efforts into that system.
There is no benefit in developing several systems and having a
half-hearted reception to each of them.

PART TWO: REASONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE

The geographic, political, economic and social structures of
African countries have contributed to impeding the implementation of CITES in countries’ domestic legislation.49 In fact,
implementation and enforcement of CITES in Africa has been
complicated by several factors. Some of these factors include:
corruption, the Precautionary Principle, the flexibility of the
Convention, lack of financial and human resources, inconsistency between countries in implementing regimes, and in some
cases a lack of political will, wars, and internal conflict.50

CORRUPTION

A major impediment to the compliance and subsequent
effectiveness of CITES is the issue of corruption.51 The 2003
Global Corruption Report cites several African countries as having serious problems of corruption.52 The report highlights corruption in various sectors. However, the aspect of greatest interest to this study and the issue of CITES is the corruption in governmental institutions. Regrettably, the institutions designated
with the authority to ensure compliance with CITES are often
those that have the highest levels of corruption. In Burkina Faso,
for instance, a corruption survey indicated that the police are the
most corrupt institution in the country. In Senegal, the traffic
police, customs officials, and police were identified as the most
corrupt institutions. In Benin, the situation is exacerbated by the
fact that transit agents help importers avoid controls in transporting illegal goods.53 It is not unrealistic to expect that the CITES
regime cannot function effectively if the very institutions which
are to guarantee its effectiveness are themselves in disrepute.
Interestingly enough, only Nigeria, which was cited as having a corrupt governmental institution, has been accorded
Category 1 status under CITES. All other countries plagued with
serious corruption problems have not been accorded such status
under CITES. For example, Mali, which has a serious problem
with the mismanagement of public funds as well as an ineffectual judicial system, has received a Category 2 classification. In
Mozambique, where corruption is extremely rife, one of the
most corrupt agencies is the port system. Mozambique falls
within the Category 3 classification.
The pattern of corruption seems to be linked with the many
armed conflicts in the region. Conflict tends to provide opportunities for illicit access to natural resources. Such is the case in
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“Congo”). It is interesting to
note that Rwanda, Somalia and Burundi, where there have been
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long-standing wars, have nevertheless all been accorded
Category 3 status.
An inextricable link appears to exist between the endemic
corruption in Africa and the ability to comply with CITES. The
greater the corruption, the lower the compliance categorization.

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The Precautionary Principle is a very contentious principle54 in international law, because States implement and interpret it differently.55 The basic premise of the Precautionary
Principle is that in the absence of scientific evidence as to the
effect of a particular substance or activity, the protection of the
environment should be the primary concern.56 Essentially, the
Precautionary Principle recognizes that scientific certainty may
often come too late to prevent environmental harm.57 In this
regard, the Precautionary Principle provides a mechanism
whereby an environmental harm can be prevented and unnecessary expenditure avoided.

“Regrettably, the
institutions designated
with the authority to
ensure compliance with
CITES are often those that
have the highest levels of
corruption.”
Although slightly different definitions have been used to
explain the Precautionary Principle, the 1992 Rio Declaration
definition is most widely accepted. The Declaration provides that
“in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible harm, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”58
The problem which developing countries have with the
Precautionary Principle is that it can be evoked to include additional species in the CITES appendices. Developing countries
have resisted the application of this principle, because its application will mean that they must be more diligent in the preservation of wildlife.59 In some instances, these countries have
taken the stance that the imposition of this principle is premised
on western ideologies, which fail to consider the peculiar situation of developing nations.

FLEXIBILITY

The inherent flexibility of CITES has contributed to the
problem of non-compliance.60 The flexibility of the Convention
40

manifests itself in several ways. For instance, CITES allows
parties to opt out of decisions pertaining to species listings. As
a result, the State Party is in no way bound by a new provision.61 Still, it must be kept in mind that this same mechanism
is essential to “keeping all the players in the cooperative process
and allowing the regime to bend62 rather than break.”63In addition to the opt-out mechanism, CITES provisions themselves
are quite flexible. For example, Article VIII, which deals with
measures that the parties may impose to enforce the provisions
of the Convention, has been interpreted to facilitate the exemption of ranching for trade in listed species. In reality, this type of
interpretative flexibility often results in a trade-off, whereby
provisions are interpreted liberally in their application, but there
is subsequently a stricter listing of species.64

the potential importer. Thus, the importer’s assessment of the
biological status of the species carries more weight than that of
the exporting State.
Article III(3)(c) has also raised concern. This provision
states that trade in Appendix 1 species must not be primarily for
commercial purposes. Although the intention of the drafters to
completely restrict trade in order to preserve the species is a
good one, this provision does not consider circumstances where
commercial trade may benefit the species and even contribute to
its preservation.
Finally, Article XIV facilitates the adoption of domestic
measures that are stricter than those of the Convention. Although
the original intent was to encourage exporting States to strengthen their domestic measures, the provision has often been used by
importing nations to curtail trade.72

“Even though CITES came into force
decades ago, several of the provisions
of the Convention remain very
contentious. Such provisions result in
non-compliance and the ineffectiveness
of the Convention.”
A necessary corollary to the flexibility of the Convention is
the down-listing of species.65 In some instances, State Parties
argue that the down-listing of a species will influence the preservation of the species. 66 For example, at a Convention held in
Harare, Southern African67 countries argued that down-listing of
ivory allowed them to sell their stockpiles of ivory.68 They stated,
in turn, that the revenue generated from such a sale69 would be
used toward elephant conservation and community development
programs. Therefore, they argued, controlled trade of ivory would
benefit the preservation of elephants. Although this argument may
seem untenable, as it is difficult to understand how depletion of a
species may result in its replenishment, one must look at the
efforts of African nations to raise such arguments in circumstances where elephant populations are constantly expanding and
wreaking havoc (i.e. by trampling crops of peasant farmers).
Often, these animals may appear to be more of a nuisance than an
asset. Thus, using the species for immediate economic gain as
well as domestic consumption70 seems more viable.71

THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

Even though CITES came into force decades ago, several
of the provisions of the Convention remain very contentious.
Such provisions result in non-compliance and the ineffectiveness of the Convention. For example, Article III(2)(d) provides
that the importing State must grant an import permit before
Appendix 1 species may be traded. The problem with the language of the provision is that it takes power to control a species
away from the exporting country, putting control in the hands of
41

LACK OF FINANCIAL AND
HUMAN RESOURCES

In several instances, African
countries have reported that their
inability to comply with the provisions has not been because of a lack of
interest, but rather because of a critical lack of finances. This is clearly
problematic, as the entire CITES system is premised on the availability of
funds.73 For example, the basic structure of the regime mandates the creation of a domestic authority to oversee provisions as well as a support system, both of which require
adequate funding. Without these structures, the police, customs,
other law enforcement agencies, and the populace at large do
not have any guaranteed assistance in achieving the provisions
of the Convention.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that in most
countries, there are no trained personnel to carry out the provisions of the Convention.74 For example, customs officials are
often untrained about which species are categorized under the
three appendices and what trade is allowed or restricted under
the Convention. Since personnel are untrained, enforcement
capacity is weak. Because enforcement capacity is weak, it is no
surprise that illicit trade goes unreported. Several countries have
noted that they have neither the resources nor the capacity to
comply with these provisions.
In order to resolve the issue of lack of funding, some countries have utilized trade in endangered species as a way of earning money.75 Such trade in endangered species76 is considered
to be very lucrative.77 In some instances, trade78 has flourished79 under CITES. For example, it is estimated that in 1998,
Zimbabwe sold about 82.8 tons of elephant hides.80 In 1997,
Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe earned an estimated $5 million from ivory sales.81
Even though it appears that there are short term gains in
trading endangered species, the costs to countries that may have
to invest more funds in anti-poaching strategies, is far greater in
the long run.
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LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Several African countries have suffered from grave political problems.82 In some instances, government instability coupled with the problems of periodic coup d’états and impending
civil wars all make compliance with CITES seem unimportant.
For example, in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia,83 it is difficult to see
how species preservation could ever be addressed in circumstances where the impending war84 continues to claim human
lives.85 As a result, governments are more concerned with
preservation of human life than with species preservation.86
Another political problem in many countries is that legislation is often inconsistent, so trade in endangered species is
addressed in a fragmented way. For example, there are glaring
inconsistencies in permit procedures, sanction provisions, legal
definitions and the conservation status of indigenous species. This
exacerbates the problem of ensuring compliance, especially since
authorities must also battle budgetary and capacity constraints.87

ture and framework of the Convention is still a strong one, and for
that reason alone, an amendment is not suggested. Perhaps a more
tenable position may be to develop new approaches to species
preservation within the existing framework.89

LACK OF FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

The issue of lack of financial resources can be addressed by
utilizing the natural resources present in a country as a way of
generating income and earning well-needed foreign exchange.
For instance, countries could follow in the footsteps of Kenya
and Namibia by promoting eco-tourism. In Kenya, tourism90 is
recorded as being the country’s largest foreign exchange earner.
Through tourism, governments can inform their local populations that economic gains can only be achieved by preservation
of endangered species, rather than by killing off species.
Income might also be generated through taxation in the
context of endangered species. Companies responsible for
depleting plant and animal resources in endangered species

“The issue of lack of financial resources can be
addressed by utilizing the natural resources present in a
country as a way of generating income and earning
well-needed foreign exchange.”
SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Many countries in the African region are faced with
unprecedented development and population pressures. In fact,
most countries in the Sub-Saharan region expect their populations to double within the next couple decades. Thus, it becomes
difficult to balance the management of population growth of
both humans and plant or animal species.

PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
PROPOSALS

To ensure compliance with CITES, it is imperative that State
Parties address the fundamental problems that have impeded the
adequate implementation of the Convention into their domestic
legislation. The international community must realize that the
answer to implementation does not lie in accession to the
Convention alone. It also lies in the implementation of infrastructure support systems. To this end, it is suggested that the following measures, where applicable, be invoked to guarantee not
only full compliance with CITES, but also to ensure species
preservation. The guiding principle of any measure that is implemented must be the ability to comply with such a measure.

FLEXIBILITY OF THE CONVENTION

Even though the flexibility of the Convention has contributed
to non-compliance, no amendments should be made.88 One of the
main arguments often used to support amendments is that the provisions of the Convention are outdated. However, the basic strucSPRING 2004

should be taxed accordingly. In Ghana, environmental taxation
exists whereby companies that pollute or deplete the environment, such as mining, bauxite, and timber companies, are directly taxed. Additionally, there is indirect taxation, where companies must replant trees felled during their operations or build
community facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and markets for
the local communities.
To address the lack of human resources, governments ought
to encourage NGO participation in their initiatives.91 Many
NGOs have professionals well-versed in relevant environmental
issues who can play an important role in disseminating information. Basically, governments must enhance cooperation with
NGOs and other major groups needed to work as social partners
for sustainable development.
Also, governments may sponsor regional and sub-regional
workshops that aim to share information about best management practices,92 develop national legislation and regulations,
train customs officials, police the enforcement methods of government entities and civil society groups (for example, the
Green Advocates in Liberia93), and also utilize training programs through organizations such as the International Network
for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (“INECE”).94

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Many African countries are now attempting to address
some of the root causes of environmental degradation through
initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s
42

Development (“NEPAD”).95 The NEPAD emphasizes good
governance with reference to environmental obligations.
Although not yet in force, the NEPAD96 proposes to deal with
the issue of the environment under eight different priority areas:
(1) desertification; (2) wetland conservation; (3) invasive alien
species; (4) coastal management; (5) global warming; (6) crossborder partnerships; (7) environmental governance; and (8)
finance from different angles.
However, markedly absent from NEPAD is any reference to
preservation of endangered species. While this issue may be
covered under “wetland conservation” or perhaps “cross-border
partnerships”, the wording of the provisions do not place suffi-

“In Kenya . . . the
imposition of criminal
sanctions led to a marked
decrease in illicit trade
and an increased number
of persons arrested for
violations of the
Convention.”
cient emphasis on endangered species. Therefore, endangered
species preservation ought to be included as the ninth area of
priority intervention in the region. Indeed, African leaders can
show true quality of leadership by promoting mandates that support environmental sustainability in all its various facets.97
Monitoring institutions must also be developed. In fact, it is
well documented that environmental agreements work best
when they are supported by a strong monitoring component.98
There are clear examples of the effectiveness of CITES when
supported by governmental initiatives.99 For example, South
Africa and Zimbabwe conduct culling programs aimed at maintaining their elephant populations at a level100 the available
habitat can support.101 By far the greatest threat to elephant
populations is poaching.102 As a result, on June 30 1989, when
Tanzania banned elephant103 hunting by its citizens, the government made it clear that illegal trade activities would not be
tolerated. This contributed significantly to curtailing the trade in
elephants. For successful enforcement of CITES, one of the first
measures is for governments to take a strong stance against illicit trade in endangered species.
Social Problems
It is necessary that education be placed at the forefront of
any CITES initiative. This includes education of enforcement
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agents, but also of local populations. This will inevitably be an
essential component of the process of curtailing illicit trade.
Another social measure that could be used is the imposition
of criminal sanctions to enforce trade issues. In Kenya, for
example, the imposition of criminal sanctions led to a marked
decrease in illicit trade and an increased number of persons
arrested for violations of the Convention. Also, arrests and
indictment for illicit trade will act as a deterrent to smugglers. It
is only when the illegal trade is sanctioned104 that States can
ensure high levels of compliance. In so doing, governments will
be sending a clear signal to violators that they are serious about
controlling the trade in endangered species.105
Another way in which State Parties can ensure compliance
with CITES is by reviewing current legislation on environment
and development to ensure that it addresses present day realities.106 National conservation legislation should incorporate creative tools and strategies in achieving sustainable legal wildlife
trade107 (for instance, through the use of incentives and the
involvement of communities in biodiversity management).108
Finally, an effective way of dealing with non-compliance
might be the use of trade sanctions.109 Since 1985, three African
countries have been subject to these sanctions. In 2001, Congo
was under scrutiny for alleged permit fraud. Rebels were discovered to have issued false CITES documents, which were then
used to transport chimpanzees across borders. The chimpanzees
were listed on Appendix 2, and as a result, were not to be traded.
Congo has not yet complied. However, the other two cases have
been successful. In Equatorial Guinea, even though it was not a
member of CITES, the Secretariat urged Parties to the
Convention to ban all trade in CITES species with the country in
1988. In 1992, Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Convention and
the ban was subsequently lifted.110 In 1999, Senegal was also
subjected to a trade sanction. In 2000, this too was lifted.

PART FOUR: CONCLUSION

Even though many countries have acceded to the
Convention, implementation of the CITES provisions in the
domestic legislation of countries in the African region is lacking. Even though this treaty was ratified by some of these countries more than twenty years ago, governments today still
require assistance in the implementation of the provisions of the
Convention. These countries’ accession to the Convention may
seem progressive, but upon closer examination, the converse is
true. Even where domestic legislation is in place, there may not
necessarily be compliance and enforcement.
This study is in no way conclusive. Some of the many issues
that still need to be addressed are: (1) what laws have been put in
place in Category 1 countries in Africa; (2) the types of enforcement mechanisms utilized in countries; (3) the effectiveness of
the enforcement mechanisms; (4) whether legal strategies, such as
taxation, can be deployed to assist with a more effective implementation of the CITES Convention; and (5) what mechanisms
ought to be used to monitor the effectiveness of CITES.
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AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
NETWORK:
IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITHIN AFRICA

T

By Shelly Dill*
INTRODUCTION

he African Environmental Information Network
(“AEIN”) is a cutting edge concept in providing access
to information within Africa. The most important result
of the AEIN is the facilitation of environmental enforcement
and compliance in a region that struggles with those goals.
Although protection of the environment is codified in a number
of environmental laws and regulations throughout the world, the
creation of regulatory instruments in many developing countries
has resulted in amplified rhetoric and minimal compliance.
Development professionals attribute this lack of compliance, in
part, to a lack of information.
Access to environmental information, therefore, has become
a vital issue in achieving international development and environmental sustainability. Sound environmental data indicating environmental well-being must be accessible by decision makers at

“Sound environmental
data indicating
environmental well-being
must be accessible by
decision makers at local,
state and national levels
in order to provide
countries with the tools
necessary to support
sustainable development”
local, state, and national levels in order to provide countries with
the tools necessary to support sustainable development.
Unfortunately, the gap between quality data in the developing
world and the developed world has only increased the incapacity of less developed countries to make informed decisions relating to the environment. In response to a global environmental
47

agenda and in an effort to ensure sustainable development, many
African governments have established a number of regulatory
instruments to protect their environmental resources.
Despite these mechanisms, however, environmental degradation is still a major obstacle to development in Africa.1 The
failure of these mechanisms stems, in part, from a lack of compliance on the part of the regulated community and a lack of
capacity on the side of enforcement agencies.2 Lack of compliance on the part of the regulated community is sometimes simply due to lack of adequate information on obligations and
available mechanisms to bring about compliance.
AEIN is an initiative that was created to provide a framework for capacity building in environmental information management, to enhance access to quality information, to ensure
public participation in environmental governance, and to
increase compliance. AEIN is an initiative of the African
Ministerial Conference on the Environment (“AMCEN”), the
preeminent African environmental policy organ.

AEIN’S OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE

AEIN is a multi-stake holder capacity building network dedicated to supporting sustainable development planning in Africa.
AEIN is spearheaded by the United Nations Environment
Program (“UNEP”) Regional Office for Africa and UNEP
Division of Early Warning and Assessment (“UNEP-DEWA”),
located in Nairobi, Kenya.3 UNEP-DEWA focuses on building
capacity for early warning and environmental assessment, thereby ensuring that proper mechanisms are in place for sustainable
development.4 The AEIN is intended to bolster Africa’s inadequate institutional capacity by addressing the following problems: the lack of harmonized efforts for environmental assessment and reporting; poor compliance and enforcement; and the
lack of integrated environmental information into decision making and sustainable development processes.5
The implementation strategy emphasizes partnerships
among new and ongoing initiatives around the continent. At the
national level the network will comprise a community of producers and users of a broad range of environmental information,
including non-governmental organizations, universities, and
research institutions. Existing institutions that have the mandate
for collecting the data will maintain their autonomy and unique
identities within the community, but will be affiliated through
data exchange protocols.
*Shelly Dill, J.D. Candidate, May 2006, American University, Washington
College of Law. The author thanks Charles Sebukeera and Ken Markowitz for
their contributions to this article.
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Examples of Progressive Strategies Under Consideration
by AEIN to Support Environmental Enforcement
– Development of Country Specific AEIN
Implementation Strategies.

– Strengthening Capacity for Integrated Assessment
and Reporting

– Developing a Common Platform for Environmental
Information Exchange in Africa

– Strengthening Communication Network Infrastructure
for Environmental Management Progress

National networks will be aggregated together at the subregional level to facilitate coordination and harmonization of
activities and information to contribute to the regional level
processes.
Key environmental issues of Africa to be addressed within
AEIN include: 1) land degradation; 2) protective and sustainable
use of forests; 3) effective management of biodiversity; 4) water
scarcity and efficient water management; 5) pollution of freshwater, urban, coastal and marine areas; 6) protection of marine
and coastal resources; 7) drought and climate change; and 8)
population pressures on natural resources and urban areas.6

IMPLEMENTATION OF AEIN

AEIN is in its first phase of a three-phase implementation,
and is currently funded, through UNEP, the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Ireland Aid.7 The emphasis in the first
phase is on identifying tools and the information network that
currently exist in African countries and to implement various
pilot activities in thirteen countries.8 These pilot activities will
test ideas with respect to networking, information sharing procedures, and the adaptation of various methodologies and tools
to local communities.9 Another early step for AEIN will be to
support each country in the development of a national strategy
to strengthen the environmental information system capacity
within the country.10
The second and third implementation phases involve filling
gaps in data to strengthen the data foundation for long-term and
institutional capacity building.11 AEIN is exploring the development of partnerships with global leaders in sustainable development (e.g., USAID, the World Bank) and with the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement (“INECE”), which supports regional capacity for
enforcement programs.12 Expected outputs from the program
include regular policy and thematic briefs, bulletins of compliance and enforcement initiatives, current environmental reports,
a web based compliance monitoring tool for environmental
inspectors, reports to international conventions, and the provision of “virtual” information through the Web.13

CONCLUSION

for the development of an African environmental regulatory system that is functional and effective. The environmental regulatory community in developed countries must be proactive in
their long-term support of environmental information initiatives
like AEIN. AEIN is in its first phase of implementation – the
crucial stage of solidifying partnerships, developing country
specific implementation strategies and implementing pilot initiatives is critical to the achievement of AEIN’s long-term
objectives. If access to transparent and high quality environmental information is not forthcoming, African leaders will not
have the information necessary to prevent further environmental degradation and vulnerability within the continent.
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AEIN is a far-reaching, innovative, and progressive program that will provide critically important infrastructure support
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BOOK REVIEW

POWER TO THE PEOPLE:

HOW THE COMING ENERGY REVOLUTION WILL TRANSFORM AN INDUSTRY,
CHANGE OUR LIVES, AND MAYBE EVEN SAVE THE PLANET
BY VIJAY VAITHEESWARAN. 327 PP. FARRAR STRAUS AND GIROUX. $25.

V

Reviewed by Matt Brown*
ijay Vaitheeswaran’s Power to the People provides a
compelling study of the world’s energy use in the past,
the present and the future. He briefly looks at the past
to show us where we have been and what we can learn from previous mistakes. His momentary exploration of the present circumstances of the energy industry point to what ills we must
cure and give signs of hope. Vaitheeswaran’s focus, however, is
clearly on the future of energy. In particular, he examines the
development of hydrogen fuel cells and the concept of micropower for their ability to replace today’s power plants as well as
their potential to revolutionize the automobile and transportation industries. Yet his searching exploration of the energy
industry is not limited to a probing study of budding hydrogen
technologies. He also studies the technological advances being
made in hydrocarbon discovery, recovery, and pollution control.
Vaitheeswaran continues his exploration by delving into the
nuclear industry. Without question, Vaitheeswaran takes the
reader on an exhaustive and searching journey through the energy industry.
Power to the People is full of challenges. That is not to say
it is a difficult read. Rather, it challenges many assumptions of
environmentalists as well as those of oil barons and coal
tycoons. No one is safe from Vaitheeswaran’s scathing equalopportunity critique. ExxonMobil boss, Lee Raymond, is singled out for leading his company in a backward looking way
without giving due notice to the future of energy beyond oil. Bill
Clinton and Al Gore’s poor leadership during the Kyoto climate
summit negotiations are also subjected to the author’s scorn.
The book does not seek to serve as a manifesto for Greens nor
does it serve as propaganda for the hydrocarbon industry, rather
it separates pure ideology out of the equation and simply tries to
convey the author’s thoughts surrounding the production of
energy and its future.
While his book appears relatively unbiased, there is a bit of
prejudice in Vaitheeswaran’s writing. He seems more enthralled
with unleashing the forces of free market environmentalism
than command and control techniques. Vaitheeswaran’s com49

mitment to ending market distorting subsidies and regulations
combined with his advocacy for taxing emissions is revisited
throughout the book. His advocacy, however, does not take
away from the value of the book—his words have the power to
persuade.
Power to the People is not only comprehensive in its examination of the energy industry but also in how energy politics
plays out across the world. Vaitheeswaran prescribes solutions
to what ails both the developed and developing world. He highlights initiatives to bring power and technology to San Ramon,
Honduras and the Maratha colony in India. Vaitheeswaran predicts that, with the right policies and incentives, the world’s
energy future could be both bright and environmentally sustainable for even the poorest in the world.
In discussing the world’s energy future, Vaitheeswaran
introduces us to the innovators as well as to the industrial
dinosaurs. Of these innovators, he highlights the contributions
of Amory Lovins, whom he affectionately refers to as the “Sage
of Snowmass.” Mr. Lovin’s work at the Rocky Mountain
Institute in developing a hydrogen fuel cell car is mentioned
excitedly throughout the book. In addition, Vaitheeswaran
focuses on the research conducted by Ballard Power, United
Technologies, and others leading the future of hydrogen fuel
cells. Vaitheeswaran explores many other segments of the
emerging fuel cell industry, giving names and stories to the scientists and business leaders who are leading the way. Power to
the People breathes life into industries that were formerly the
stuff of brief newspaper articles and campaign speeches.
Vijay Vaitheeswaran’s Power to the People is an accessible
and comprehensive look at a highly technical field. One need
not be an engineer or a policy wonk to join Vaitheeswaran’s
journey—a journey well worth taking. Power to the People illuminates the troubles of the past and present in order to articulate
a vision of a future with abundant and environmentally sustainable energy supplies.
*J.D. Candidate, May 2004, American University, Washington College of Law.
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by Lydia Edwards, Kirk Herbertson
& Dave Karlinsky

AFRICA

USAID AND SHELL TO SPEND $20 MILLION ON
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA

In February, the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”), the International Institute of
Tropical Agriculture, and the Shell Petroleum Development
Company (“SPDC”) signed an agreement to implement a $20
million development program in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.1
Shell is the largest producer of Nigerian oil.2 The purpose of
the program is to diversify the source of livelihoods in the
impoverished region.3 Shell will contribute $15 million, and
USAID will contribute $5 million, towards the development
of a large-scale cassava enterprise.4 Shell plans to continue
signing similar agreements with other international development agencies in an effort to ease the tension in underdeveloped communities in oil-bearing regions.5 The Niger Delta
region has been the site of ethnic violence. In the past year,
Shell was forced to evacuate its facilities due to violence in
the Warri area.6

BIKES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The International Bicycle Foundation (“IBF”) is an independent, non-profit organization that promotes a sustainable,
people-friendly environment by creating opportunities of the
highest practicable quality for bicycle transportation.7 IBF
efforts are found all over the world in such countries as Guyana,
Ecuador, and India.
In Tunisia, IBF works with Femmes pour le Dévelopment
Durable (“Women for Sustainable Development”), a Tunisian
social and environmental organization. Together they reach the
needs of urban and rural women by encouraging the use of bicycles. This effort also encourages pollution control and generates
income for many women. The IBF encourages women to use
bicycles through games, theater plays, paintings, rallies, awards,
booklets, conferences, seminars and workshops. To date, IBF
has motivated over 2,000 Tunisian women to start cycling, a
majority under age twenty-five.8
In Ghana, IBF’s provides bicycle trailers to women as an
alternative to head portage. But the bicycles are also seen as a
means to help democratization. In some districts, local government officials walk thirty-one miles to perform assembly functions. The bikes provide a means of transportation in areas that
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are not easily accessible by car. So far, 200 bikes have been provided on a hire-to-purchase program.9

TENSIONS RISING OVER NILE WATER

A conference scheduled for March 2004 will attempt to settle brewing disputes over the use of the Nile River.10
Representatives of the Nile Basin nations (Kenya, Tanzania,
Egypt, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, Ethiopia, and
Eritrea) will meet to discuss issues such as irrigation rights and
potential hydroelectric projects.
A 1929 treaty between Egypt and Great Britain, who signed
on behalf of its colonized regions, governs current use of the
river. Under the treaty, Egypt has the right to veto any appropriation of Lake Victoria’s water if it believes that Nile flows may
be threatened. Nations in the river’s upper-basin region therefore have little say regarding how this water is used. In recent
years, several of these nations have experienced drought,
famine, and extreme poverty. Soil erosion and deforestation
plague the region. Many people wonder why they cannot use the
waters flowing through their lands. They question whether they
must abide by the terms of a treaty signed by colonial masters
who have long since disappeared.
Some upper-basin politicians criticize the World Bank for
perpetuating the treaty’s terms. The World Bank has refused to
provide loans to pay for water infrastructure projects in the
upper basin until lower-basin nations (such as Egypt) consent.
This is a significant obstacle. Egypt has obvious incentives to
maintain its generous supply of Nile water. Over 95% of Egypt’s
water supply comes from the river. Furthermore, most of the
country’s population resides in the river valley, occupying only
4% of the country’s territory.

U.S. COMPANIES WILL RETURN TO LIBYAN OIL

On February 26, 2004, U.S. companies with holdings in
Libya were granted permission by the White House to resume
deals that had been stalled by 1986 sanctions against Libya.11
The Bush Administration lifted the ban on travel to Libya and
invited companies to begin the process of returning but only
after Moammar Gadhafi’s government renounced weapons of
mass destruction, allowed weapons inspectors to enter, and
accepted responsibility for the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing.12 Libyan oil production has declined to about half of its
level of 1970. This summer Libya plans to allow foreign companies to bid on five exploration sites.13 If U.S. economic sanctions remain in place, any agreements made by American oil
companies will require U.S. approval.14
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ASIA

WOMEN TAKING INITIATIVE IN INDIA

Women for Sustainable Development (“WSD”) is an organization in India that promotes sustainable development to
achieve its goal to assist women.15 They hope to help all women
attain a minimum standard of human existence in their villages
and towns, and to help set up a forum for women to meet,
debate, and decide on matters concerning the development of
their lives.
One way this organization has achieved its goal to assist
women is through the running of a prototype carbon marketing
facility in order to monitor and sell Certified Emissions
Reductions (“CERS”) from global environmental services.
Another aim of the organization is economic stability for poor
rural women. Pursuant to that goal, WSD runs a loan fund for
women to borrow money for dairy cows.

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS EVICTED IN CHINA IN
PREPARATION FOR OLYMPICS

The Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction
(“Cohre”) announced on February 25, 2004 that China had
evicted 300,000 people from their homes in Beijing in preparation for the 2008 Summer Olympics.16 Scott Leckie, Executive
Director of Cohre, reported that such evictions often accompany large international events.17 Residents of Rome had also
been evicted in preparation for the 2004 Summer Olympics.18

EXPANSION OF WATER PRIVATIZATION IN INDONESIA

The Indonesian legislature has endorsed a water bill allowing for the privatization of the water sector, even though price
increases are expected.19 Providing clean water to municipal and
industrial areas may become a profitable business for private corporations both in the United States and in developing countries.20 Municipal governments throughout the world are
increasingly having difficulties maintaining public water systems. In Jakarta, Indonesia, 90% of 300 province- and regencyowned tap water companies are on the verge of collapse, because
they have been selling water at prices well below production
costs.21 In India, though, there has been opposition to the idea of
privatization of water. The Delhi Jal Board, which runs the capital city’s water supply and sewage disposal, and the Delhi government recently rejected a World Bank report’s suggestions for
the privatization of the water sector.22 In the U.S., General
Electric has already developed a highly profitable water processing division, GE Water Technologies.23 Dow Chemicals has
begun a venture called Filmtek, a water purification company,
which is not yet making significant profit.24 Private water corporations may have an increasing presence in the near future.

MIDDLE EAST

INVASIVE JELLYFISH THREATENS CASPIAN SEA

An invasive species of jellyfish, the “Mnemiopis”, is decimating native fish stocks in the Caspian Sea and threatening
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local fisheries that depend on the stability of the Caspian’s
ecosystem.25 Only two inches long, the jellyfish reproduces rapidly, producing up to 8,000 offspring per day. Mnemiopis feeds
on plankton, which are the primary food source of small native
fish known as “kilka.” Caspian sturgeon, which feed on kilka,
are threatened by the invasion. Local fishermen who harvest
sturgeon produce most of the world’s supply of caviar.
Iran has proposed introducing a new fish into the Caspian Sea
to combat the threat. The new fish is known as Beroe ovata,
and is native to the Black Sea. Scientists hope that this new
fish will consume the Mnemiopis in great numbers and help
preserve the Caspian’s native ecosystem and its valuable fisheries. There is uncertainty, however, whether this new species
can survive in the Caspian’s less salty waters.

AMERICAS

BOLIVIAN INDIGENOUS POPULATION UNSEATS THE
PRESIDENT

Following a hunger strike by the residents of El Alto, a
Bolivian town populated by Aymaran Indians, the indigenous
population of Bolivia began demonstrations which ultimately
lead to the resignation of President Lozada.26
The demonstrations began when the President announced
that Bolivia would start to export natural gas to the United
States and Mexico. The demonstrators alleged that the continued privatization of industry, cost cutting, and pro-U.S. policies
advocated by the IMF and the World Bank have increased
poverty in the country. They also demanded respect for land
tenure agreements and opposed the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas. 27 The government believed that the gas exports
would attract foreign capital, thereby boosting the economy.
The demonstrators piled rocks, blocking all streets that lead
to La Paz, the nation’s capital. They continued for a month,
essentially shutting down the city. Striking tin miners and peasants from the Yungas lowlands converged on the capital and
continued the blockade of the capital.
The President’s power was very weak even before the
protests began. While running for office, he received the same
amount of votes as his left wing opponent. 28 He was appointed
by the Congress. In February, his authority was weakened further as a result of protests against an IMF-backed tax.
President Lozada resigned on October 17, 2003, and Vice
President Carlos Mesa was sworn in to complete his term. 29
Gas exports have been delayed until December. 30

U.S. LANDMINE POLICY ALTERED

On February 27, 2004, the Bush Administration altered the
ten-year U.S. policy on eliminating landmines. The original policy began in 1994, when the United States became the first
nation to call for the elimination of all persistent landmines.
Landmines can lay active for decades before exploding. There
have been over 300,000 victims of landmines and 10,000 victims are added annually.31 The call for the elimination of persistent landmines was part of a worldwide movement that culSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

minated in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Currently, 141 countries
have signed the treaty. Now, the United States will be the only
member of NATO not party to the treaty.32
The U.S. had planned to join the Mine Ban Treaty by
2006.33 The new policy decision has pushed that date back to
2010. Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Bloomfield has
pointed out that the mines causing the injury toll are not from
the U.S. armed forces with the exception of some left over from
the Vietnam conflict. 34
The Bush Administration’s new policy distinguishes
between persistent mines and smart mines. While continuing to
ban persistent mines, the policy allows for smart mines. Smart
mines self-destruct within a certain number of hours or days. If
the self-destruct mechanisms fail, then the battery will expire
within 90 days.35
Stephen Goose, Executive Director of the Arms Division of
Human Rights Watch, criticized the U.S. decision, because the
policy change allows U.S. forces to use smart mines indefinitely.36 Assistant Secretary of State Bloomfield commented that
the U.S is still interested in decreasing mine use, and will work
through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to
end the indiscriminate use of all landmines.

GRAY WOLVES CONSIDERED FOR DE-LISTING AS
ENDANGERED SPECIES

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has moved to de-list the
North American gray wolf under the Endangered Species Act
claiming that the wolf has recovered successfully since being reintroduced into Yellowstone National Park in 1995.37
The last native gray wolf in Yellowstone National Park was
killed in the 1930s. In 1995, as part of an ambitious recovery program, the wolf was reintroduced into the park and protected
under the Endangered Species Act. Since reintroduction, the
wolves have prospered in Yellowstone’s protected habitat. Wolfwatching now ranks as one of the park’s most popular attractions.
Inside Yellowstone, wolves are well-protected, but some
wildlife experts worry that de-listing the species is premature.
The species’ survival, they argue, ultimately depends on the
wolves’ ability to cross-breed among the different populations to
combat threats of disease. However, many miles of rangeland
and settled terrain separate these populations. Three distinct
populations of gray wolves remain in the continental United
States. In addition to the Yellowstone wolves, populations survive in central Idaho and northwestern Montana.
Only thirty-eight species have been de-listed under the Act
since 1967. Over twelve hundred species are still listed as
endangered.

COURT REFUSES TO ALLOW EPA TO EXTEND OZONE
POLLUTION DEADLINES IN D.C.

In early February, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit ordered the EPA to impose more severe controls on
ozone pollution in the Washington, D.C. metro region.38 The
Court refused to allow the EPA to give the region an extension
until 2005 to meet the Clean Air Act 1999 deadline for ozone
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pollution standards.39 Washington D.C. has been a consistent
violator of ozone pollution standards in the past, and is one of
the worst U.S. cities for smog.40 The EPA had attempted to
extend the deadline after concluding that many of the ozoneforming particles in the city blow in from other regions.41 This
court ruling may force city officials to enact more regulations or
face federal sanctions.42 Areas in “severe” violation of EPA
standards are supposed to reduce ozone-forming emissions by
3% each year until compliance is reached.43 The suit was
brought by the Sierra Club, its third successful suit against the
EPA regarding ozone pollution in the Washington, D.C. area.44

EURASIA

RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
SOUGHT

On February 26, 2004, the European Energy
Commissioner, Loyala de Palacio, asked Russia to clarify
whether it intended to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, calling Russia’s
decision vital to the future of the treaty.45 The Kyoto Protocol
cannot be implemented until it has been backed by industrial
nations that produce a combined 55% of the world’s greenhouse
gases.46 Since the U.S. did not sign, Russia must sign for the
treaty to come into effect.47 By signing the Protocol, a country
commits to scaling back emissions of six greenhouse gases to
1990 levels by 2012.48 Recently, Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s economic advisor, Andrei Illarionov, said that Russia’s
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would doom the Russian
economy to “poverty, weakness, backwardness”, and argued
that while the Protocol is clearly favored by countries dependent on nuclear energy, it would be detrimental to the oil and gas
economy of Russia.49

BTC OIL PIPELINE THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA APPROVED

After years of debate, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”)
crude oil pipeline has been approved.50 The pipeline, due to be
operational by March 2005, will transport one million barrels
per day over the 1760km from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea
to Turkey.51 British Petroleum (“BP”) is the largest shareholder
in the BTC Consortium, but the project is also being co-financed
by the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) of the World
Bank.52 The proposed pipeline has been the source of controversy between the Consortium and environmentalists. From one
perspective, the pipeline will provide economic benefits to
Azerbaijan, one of the world’s poorest nations, and it will
reduce U.S. and European dependence on oil from the Persian
Gulf.53 But on the other hand, it will pass through several environmentally sensitive regions, such as habitats of endangered
species and a mineral water deposit.54 The World Wildlife Fund
has criticized pipeline constructors for placing an inadequate
anti-corrosion coating on sections of the pipeline already
buried.55 Consequently, pipeline corrosion may be a problem in
the future.
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INTERNATIONAL CALENDAR

MAY

FOURTH WORLD FISHERIES CONGRESS

RECONCILING FISHERIES WITH CONSERVATION: The Challenge of
Managing Aquatic Ecosystems
Vancouver, BC, Canada
May 2-6, 2004
Web Site: http://www.worldfisheries2004.org/program/congress_theme.htm

ISCRAM 2004: THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON

INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR CRISIS RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT
Brussels, Belgium
May 3-4, 2004
Web Site: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/iscram2004

ADVANCED INSTITUTE ON VULNERABILITY TO GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
Laxenburg, Austria
May 3-21, 2004
Web Site: http://www.start.org/links/announce_oppo/
P3_Announcement.pdf

CONFERENCE ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGISTRIES,
CLIMATE POLICY AND THE BOTTOM LINE

San Diego, California, United States
May 5-7, 2004
Web Site: http://www.climateregistry.org/EVENTS/Conference

COURSE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP POLICIES
AND STRATEGIES: IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY IN
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Cape Town, South Africa
May 10-24, 2004
Web Site: http://www.ip3.org

GLOBAL H20 PARTNERSHIP CONFERENCE
Cairns, Australia
May 11-14, 2004
Web Site: http://www.hilltops2oceans.org

OECD FORUM 2004- HEALTH OF NATIONS
Paris, France
May 12-13, 2004
Web Site: http://www1.oecd.org/forum2004

CONFERENCE ON THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY
Hamburg, Germany
May 12-14, 2004
Web Site: http://www.hwwa.de/climate.htm

GEN ROUNDTABLE:

BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADE: Untangling the Key Issues

International Environment House, Geneva, Switzerland
May 19, 2004
Web Site: http://www.environmenthouse.ch/roundtables.htm

FORUM BARCELONA 2004: Universal Forum of Cultures

COASTAL SOCIETY 2004 CONFERENCE

THIRD SESSION OF THE PERMANENT FORUM ON
INDIGENOUS ISSUES: INDIGENOUS WOMEN

SECOND WORLD RENEWABLE ENERGY FORUM

Barcelona, Spain
May 9- Sept 26, 2004
Web Site: http://www.barcelona2004.org/eng/

New York, United States
May 10-21, 2004
Web Site: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/pfii/PFII3/index.html
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Newport, Rhode Island, United States
May 23-26, 2004
Web Site:
http://www.thecoastalsociety.org/conference/tcs19/index.html
Bonn, Germany
May 30-31, 2004
Web Site: http://www.world-council-for-renewable-energy.org
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JUNE

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGIES
Bonn, Germany
June 1-4, 2004
Web Site: http://www.renewables2004.de/

SHARING INDIGENOUS WISDOM: AN INTERNATIONAL
DIALOGUE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Green Bay, Wisconsin, United States
June 6-10, 2004
Web Site:
http://www.sharingindigenouswisdom.org/default.asp

FIFTH MEETING OF THE OPEN-END INFORMAL
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON OCEANS AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA

New York, United States
June 7-11, 2004
Web Site: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/
consultative_process.htm

G-8 SEA ISLAND SUMMIT

Sea Island, Georgia, United States
June 8-10, 2004
Web Site: http://g8usa.gov

11TH UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD XI)
Sao Paulo, Brazil
June 13-18, 2004
Web Site: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Startpage.asp?
intItemID=1942&lang=1

TENTH INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF SYMPOSIUM
(ICRS)
Okinawa, Japan
June 28- July 2, 2004
Web Site: http://www.plando.co.jp/icrs2004/

MEETING OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Puerto Rico
June 29-30, 2004
Web Site: http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/10/index.htm

JULY

COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
Geneva, Switzerland
July 6-7, 2004
Web Site: http://www.wto.org

SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 2004

Segovia, Spain
July 7-9, 2004
Web Site: http://www.wessex.ac.uk/conferences/2004/sustainabletourism04/index.html

8TH BIENNIAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
Montreal, Canada
July 11-14, 2004
Web Site: http://www.ecologicaleconomics.org

2004 XV INTERNATIONAL HIV/AIDS CONFERENCE
Bangkok, Thailand
July 11-16, 2004
Web Site: http://www.aids2004.org

24TH OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP MEETING OF
THE PARTIES TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER
Geneva, Switzerland
July 12-16, 2004
Web Site: http://www.unep.org/ozone

2004 TUNZA INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S
CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT
New London, Connecticut, United States
July 19-23, 2004
Web Site: http://www.icc04.org/home.html

SEVENTH INTECOL INTERNATIONAL WETLANDS
CONFERENCE
Utrecht, Netherlands
July 25-30, 2004
Web Site: http://www.bio.uu.nl/intecol

WATER AND WASTEWATER ADVICE FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe
July 28-30, 2004
Email: wamdec2004@eng.uz.ac.zw

WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
(22ND SESSION)
Geneva, Switzerland
July 2004 (to be determined)
Web Site: http://www.unhchr.ch
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AUGUST

THE SECOND WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON GENDER
AND FORESTRY
Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania
August 1-10, 2004
Organized by University of Ghana
Email: ardayfel@ug.edu.gh

SEPTEMBER

NINETEENTH WORLD ENERGY CONGRESS

Sydney, Australia
September 5-9, 2004
Web Site: http://www.tourhosts.com.au/energy2004

TWELFTH ANNUAL SHORT COURSE IN GLOBAL TRADE
ANALYSIS

AD HOC EXPERT GROUP ON CONSIDERATION WITH A
VIEW TO RECOMMENDING THE PARAMETERS OF A
MANDATE FOR DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON
ALL TYPES OF FORESTS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL WATERS
ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATED WATERS MANAGEMENT

SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE &
EXHIBITION: DELIVERING SUSTAINABLE COASTS: CONNECTING

Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States
August 7-13, 2004
Web Site: http://www.gtap.org

Kalmar, Sweden
August 22-25, 2004
Web Site: http://www.giwa.net/conference2004

13TH WORLD CLEAN AIR AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CONGRESS AND EXHIBITION
London, United Kingdom
August 22-27, 2004
Web Site: http://www.kenes.com/cleanair

FORESTS UNDERCHANGING CLIMATE
Oulu, Finland
August 27-31, 2004
Web Site: http://iufro.ffp.csiro.au/iufro

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE TEN-YEAR
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BARBADOS
PROGRAMME OF ACTION
St. Louis, Mauritius
August 28- September 3, 2004
Web Site: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sids/sids.htm

New York, United States
September 6-10, 2004
Web Site: http://www.un.org/esa/forests

SCIENCE AND POLICY
Aberdeen, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
September 20-22, 2004
Web Site: http://www.biodiv.org/events/www.littoral2004.org

MONITORING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM:
UNIFYING KNOWLEDGE FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
Denver, Colorado, United States
September 22-24, 2004

SOURCES: Calendar
http://www.sdgateway.net/events/default.asp

http://www.iisd.ca/upcoming/linkagesmeetings.asp?id=1
http://www.unep.org/
http://www.ictsd.org/

http://www.un.org/partners/
http://biodiv.org/events

If you know of an event that you would like publicized in an
upcoming issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy, please
contact us at: sdlp@wcl.american.edu
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COMING SOON
SPECIAL ISSUE - SUMMER 2004

PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT:

EMERGENCE AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND IMPLEMENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL,
NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS
Stemming from a conference in the spring of 2004 at
American University Washington College of Law, co-sponsored
by American University Washington College of Law, CIEL, and
Sustainable Development Law & Policy.
This issue will focus on the development of the principle of prior informed consent in international law.
It will look at the rights that the principle establishes for national governments, local communities, and other
indigenous people and at how they are applied in a variety of different contexts, for example, biosafety, persistent organic pollutants, dams and extractive industries, and genetic resources. It will also consider the
challenges that arise in implementing this principle at the international, national, and local levels.
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